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URBANISM AND
SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT:
USEFUL
FRAMEWORKS
FOR
COMBATING
CLIMATE
CHANGE
SOPHIE FAABORG-ANDERSON
Abstract

4

Our globe is undergoing the greatest surge
of urban growth in history, and the number
of people living without access to basic
services is increasing. As cities and poverty
skyrocket in positive correlation, the concept
that saving the environment must come at
the price of slowed social and economic
development becomes increasingly
convincing. While sustainability and
urbanization are not mutually exclusive,
creating a framework for development that
fulfills the needs of an increasingly
urbanized world without undermining the
ability of future generations to satisfy their
needs is modeled by a variety of theoretical
approaches. Faced with the challenges
presented by a growing population limited
by natural resources, realizing sustainable
development will require a unique style of
leadership that capitalizes on new
opportunities through innovation at the
national and regional levels. This paper
seeks to outline the demands of two major
sustainable urban design theories, free

market environmentalism (FME) and the
eco-city movement, and to address their
social justice implications.
Introduction

A frequently cited definition of
sustainable development comes from the
Brundtland Report by the United Nations
World Commission on Environment
Development (WCED) – “sustainable
development is development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs”1. The definition implies two
essential components that create two
different sets of best practices for urban
development. The first half of the definition
addresses the needs of the collective and the
individual by suggesting the importance of
meeting standards for an equitable and
comfortable lifestyle. The later part of the
Brundtland definition concerns itself with
the idea of limitations imposed by social
organization in the context of a finite set of
resources. Densely populated urban areas
focus on efficiency in providing services to
inhabitants, but the best practices for
achieving sustainability are widely debated.
Free market environmentalism finds its roots
mostly in the first part of the Brundtland
definition and focuses on economic
implications of urban design. On the other
hand, eco-city approach stresses the “ability
of future generations to meet their own
needs” by considering functional planning
and social implications of urban
development.
Proponents of a first approach to urban
design, free market environmentalism
(FME), view urban sustainability as a
prerogative of the individual and
marketplace, maintaining that economic
1
"Topic." Sustainable Development. International Institute
for Sustainable Development (IISD), n.d. Web.
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growth is a prerequisite to improving
environmental quality. As part of a larger
neoliberal approach, free market
sustainability prioritizes individual freedoms
and innovation in the capitalist marketplace
and views economic incentives as the
driving mechanism for urban development2.
Thus, sustainability and green consumption
are parts of the individual consumer’s
freedom and citizenship in a self-regulated
marketplace. The free market is the engine
of growth and innovation that powers an
economically preferable green lifestyle. Free
market environmentalists believe that since
property rights allow for legitimate
exchanges and gains from trade, the
marketplaces makes the environment an
asset rather than a liability. By putting a
price value on environmental assets like land
and natural resources, the market
incentivizes stewardship3. Defaulting to
political and regulatory processes presents
several challenges in water management,
city planning, and regulatory regimes.
The state of California has been
plagued by severe drought for decades,
exacerbated by the inflexible water laws and
regulatory environment that discourages
conservation. More than 24 million people
have been impacted by the most recent
period of drought, which State Governor
Jerry Brown declared a state of emergency
in January of 20144. Free market
environmentalists point to the $900 million
loss in crop revenues in 2015 alone to stress
the severity of the situation. As California’s
population is projected to rise by 6 million
by 2030, water allocation and conservation
is a major component of urban sustainability

across the state3. Government ordered
reallocation of water creates inefficient
outcomes with winners and losers in which
voluntary, social beneficial trades are
discouraged5.
The free market approach to urban
sustainability emphasizes adopting market
prices that reflect the scarcity and value of
goods. Until December of 2011, residents of
Folsom, California were charged a constant
monthly rate of $35 for water services,
rather than a price relative to the volume of
water consumed6. Daily consumption
averaged an incredible 429 gallons per
person in 2014. Residents of Sacramento,
where water services are priced according to
use, consumed an averaged 150 gallons less
per day, at 279 gallons per day in 2014.
Government-led urban sustainability
further leads to contradictions across and
between states and regions. The Endangered
Species Act (ESA) includes a stipulation
that water from certain river systems that are
home to protected species like the Delta
smelt, endemic to the Sacramento-San
Joaquin Estuary of California, may not be
compromised by commercial and
recreational use of the water source. At the
same time, the U.S Bureau of Reclamation,
U.S Army Corp of Engineers, and federally
funded Central Valley Project provide water
subsidies for farming, hydropower
generation, and other purposes7. The
Wildlife & Marine Resource Section
(WMRS) of the U.S Department of Justice
represents these federal action agencies in
litigations seeking to balance the contentious
junction between water use for farming and
the biological demands of endangered
species. The U.S Fish and Wildlife Service

2

5

Baumol, William J. The Free-Market Innovation Machine:
Analyzing the Growth Miracle of Capitalism. N.p.:
Princeton UP, 2002. Web.
3
Lorr, Michael J. "Defining Urban Sustainability in the
Context of North American Cities." Nature and Culture.
Berghahn Journals, Spring 2012. Web.
4
"California Drought." California Water Science Center.
United States Geological Survey (USGS), 26 Jan. 2017.
Web.

5
Watson, Reed. "Tapping Water Market in California: Six
Policy Reforms." Property and Environment
6
"Council Approves Utility Rate Changes." Navigation.
City of Folsom, California, Jan. 2011. Web.
7
"The Endangered Species Act and the States." The
Endangered Species Act of 1973(2012): 173-202. U.S Fish
& Wildlife Service. Web.
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and National Marine Fisheries Services, who
defend the biological needs of ESAprotected resources and species, are often
the defendants in such litigations.
Conflicting regulation creates tensions
between state entities, farming communities,
and commercial users of the water sources.
The conflicting regulation is worsened by a
culturally entrenched “use it or lose it”
conceptualization of water as a resource in
California.
A second approach to urban
sustainable development recognizes the
interconnected nature of environment and
equity, supporting governmental reform and
new policy ideas for smart growth.
Designing urban environments is becoming
an increasingly cross-cutting discipline,
including everything from green mass transit
to sustainable movements like New
Urbanism and European Urban Renaissance.
At 6.5 billion urban residents, more than two
thirds of the world’s population is projected
to live in urban areas by 20508. The ethos of
the eco-city approach is rooted in a
synergistic integration of economic
productivity and healthy living, pioneered
by theorist and author Richard Register in
the mid 1970’s9. Register, who founded the
California based nonprofit Ecocity Builders,
spearheaded the eco-city movement which
harmonizes citizenship, regional differences,
and existing policies to develop functionally
integrated yet green urban centers10.
Eco-city design includes functional/
operational and social dimensions that must

both be considered to holistically understand
and execute urban development11.
Functionally, urban planning deals with use
of shared space and mobility within the city.
A challenge in urban design is making use
of multi-use green spaces that can translate
to greater urban vitality and a healthier
lifestyle. The social dimension concerns
itself with how the physical environment
impacts social groups and individuals. Ecocity design views urban space as an
extension of public life as a platform for
ecological citizenship and social
interaction11. Striking the right balance
between collective sustainability and
individual wellbeing within a shared urban
environment is a concern of the eco-city
movement.
Most urban design theories highlight
the importance of compact and high density
development in making a city functional and
green. Functional zoning, or the sectioning
of urban centers into areas of similar
purpose or tract of activity, is often cited as
a roadblock to effective urban planning12.
Zoning inhibits socially diverse
communities, as racial and economic gaps
separate the haves from the have-nots.
Integrated, multitrack city centers are
necessary and desirable to minimize
commute time and thus car dependency,
provide more opportunities for social
engagement and interactions, and greater
choice in lifestyle, location, and access to
facilities13. This conventional understanding
has broadened the policy initiatives and
support for city farming movements; city

8

6

Turner, Vicotria. "Sustainable Urbanism: An Integrative
Analysis of Master Planned Developments as a Vehicle for
Urban Environmental Sustainability." Requirements for the
Degree Doctor of Philosophy. Arizona State University,
Aug. 2013. Web.
9
Balula, Luis D. "Urban Design And Planning Policy:
Theoretical Foundations and Prospects For A New
Urbanism." Urban Design and Planning Policy - Metadata.
The Graduate School of New Brunswick, Jan. 2010. Web.
2017.
10
"Founder and Emissary of Ecocity Builders." Visionary
Revolutionary - Richard Register. Ecocity Builders, n.d.
Web.

11

Balula, Luis D. "Urban Design And Planning Policy:
Theoretical Foundations and Prospects For A New
Urbanism." Urban Design and Planning Policy - Metadata.
The Graduate School of New Brunswick, Jan. 2010. Web.
2017.
12
Frug, Gerald E. City Making: Building Communities
Without Building Walls. N.p.: Princeton UP, 2001. Print.
13
Grace, Lee Ka Lee. "Sustainable Urban Renewal Model
for a High Density City - Hong Kong." Department of
Building and Real Estate. The Hong Kong Polytechnic
University, June 2008. Web.
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governments have crafted policies
permitting small-scale livestock and
revisited building codes to authorize rooftop
gardens, while both state and municipal
governments promote commercial urban
farming with tax incentives.
The disproportionate focus and
reliance on traffic engineering has led to city
layouts that prioritize transport by car and
make travel by bike or foot impractical if not
hazardous. Functional urban design must
focus on reducing dependency on cars by
creating more integrated green spaces within
city centers. Disproportionate reliance on
finance resources like oil and natural gas
result in high transportation costs and
serious environmental externalities16. As
finite resources are increasingly unable to
satisfy growing demand for an energyintensive way of life, existing land use
patterns of separating residential and
commercial use areas will no longer suit
urban needs14. Functionally zoned areas will
be replaced by multi-functional, dense,
green urban hubs.
Interpersonal relationships are
influenced by the layout of urban spaces
which seek to balance collective
sustainability with individual freedoms.
While urban design in isolation may not be
enough to bring about social change, the
ability of an environment to provide
accessible public spaces for improving
quality of life is an important component of
sustainability. The Slow Food Movement,
founded by Carlo Petrini in 1986, promotes
consuming locally by promoting small
businesses and opposing industrialized food
production15. The movement expanded to
include branches in Switzerland, Germany,
France, Japan, the UK, and Chile among
others. Slow Food’s political agenda

7

14
Lorr, Michael J. "Defining Urban Sustainability in the
Context of North American Cities." Nature and Culture.
Berghahn Journals, Spring 2012. Web.
15
"Association." CittaSlow - Philosophy. CittaSlow
International, n.d. Web.

includes educating citizens about the
disadvantages of commercial agribusiness
and mass farming, and lobbying against the
use of pesticides and genetic engineering.
The shift towards less polluted, congested
urban centers is a cornerstone of the social
dimension of eco-city urban development16.
A growing literature on urban
sustainability casts cities in a new light,
characterizing urban hubs less as epicenters
of consumption and rather as the drivers of
urban sustainable development and
environmental citizenship. Both free market
environmentalism and the eco-city
movement address hard questions about land
use and access to green space, urban
transportation, urban ecology, and utilities.
In an increasingly globalized and networked
world, the connections between
environmental issues and social justice are
demanding greater attention. Advocates of
urban design often view city farming and
creation of green space, whether through
government regulation or free-market
balancing, as a way to mitigate deep-seated
social justice issues. Both proponents of
FME and eco-cities often frame urban
agriculture and green spaces in a positive
light, but a thorough analysis of sustainable
development must consider the social justice
implications of new city designs. Even
though urban farming has historically been a
means for low-income residents of densely
populated city spaces to survive and feed
their families, some parts of sustainable
design theory focus heavily on design
elements that benefit a predominantly
middle-class, white population of city
farmers17.
16

Balula, Luis D. "Urban Design And Planning Policy:
Theoretical Foundations and Prospects For A New
Urbanism." Urban Design and Planning Policy - Metadata.
The Graduate School of New Brunswick, Jan. 2010. Web.
2017.
17
Reynolds, Kristin, and Nevin Cohen. Beyond the Kale:
Urban Agriculture and Social Justice Activism in New York
City. Athens: U of Georgia, 2016. Print.
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COMMUNITYBASED WATER
MANAGEMENT
IN RURAL
KENYA
MANDY LEE
Abstract
Access to safe, reliable, and affordable water
remains a major challenge for many
communities and households across Kenya,
and this challenge will likely be exacerbated
by the impacts of climate change and rapid
population growth in coming decades. A
diversity of approaches is needed to protect
and enhance livelihoods that are vulnerable
to environmental changes. In contrast to
significant foreign aid projects and nonprofit involvement in Kenya, communitybased development acknowledges the ways
in which Kenyan communities themselves
are best suited to prioritize, design, and
guide development solutions. This article
seeks to identify the benefits of a
community-based approach for sustainable
water management in rural Kenya, as well as
explore the role of outside actors under this
framework.
Introduction

A useful starting point for thinking about
9

community empowerment is the concept of
asset-based community development
(ABCD). Developed by John McKnight and
John Kretzmann at Northwestern University,
ABCD is a framework for identifying the
resources and potential within communities.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
operating in Africa assumed a needs-based
approach, which defines poverty as the
absence or lack of the basic elements
required for human survival.1 Over time, the
needs-based approach can become selfperpetuating, encouraging a reliance on
outside experts and funding to “discover”
and remedy problems in a given
community.2 Rather than focusing on the
needs or deficiencies of a place, ABCD
emphasizes that community assets are the
key building blocks in effective, long-term
development efforts. Community assets may
include: “the skills of local residents; the
power of local associations; the resources of
public, private and non-profit institutions;
the physical infrastructure and space in a
community; the economic resources and
potential of local places; and the local
history and culture of a neighborhood.”3 As
opposed to the top-down development
model facilitated by outsiders, local
residents design and implement solutions
that leverage existing assets and build future
assets. In many ways, ABCD reaffirms the
“‘self-help’ processes by which
communities in Sub-Saharan Africa have
historically and culturally been their own
first investors.”4

1

Cormac Russell and Ted Smeaton, “From Needs to Assets:
Charting a Sustainable Path Towards Development in SubSaharan African Countries” (presentation, Global
Sustainable Development Conference, 2009).; Sebastian
Mathews, “Asset–Based, Community-Driven Development
(ABCD) in South Africa: Rebuilding Communities from
the Inside Out” (presentation, University of Johannesburg
Centre for Small Business Development Conference, 2013).
2
Russell and Smeaton, “From Needs to Assets.”; Terry
Bergdall, “Reflections on the Catalytic Role of an Outsider
in Asset-Based Community Development,” ABCD Institute,
2012, Accessed January 3,
http://www.abcdinstitute.org/publications/downloadable/in
dex.html.
3
“Founders,” Asset-Based Community Development
(ABCD) Institute, 2017, Accessed December 20, 2016,
http://www.abcdinstitute.org/about/founders/index.html.
4
Russell and Smeaton, “From Needs to Assets.”
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By exploring the context of
development and water management in
Kenya, it becomes clear that asset-based
community development is an important
model to help expand clean water access to
underserved consumers.
Water Management Arrangements in
Kenya
Kenyan government and civil society
entities have long been committed to
ensuring that water is available, accessible,
adequate, safe, and affordable for all citizens.
However, the country struggles with
physical and economic water scarcity.5
Four-fifths of the country is arid or semiarid and prone to drought, and many areas
are unable to take advantage of water
resources that could help improve
livelihoods due to lacking investment.6
According to the WHO/UNICEF Joint
Monitoring Programme for Water Supply
and Sanitation, an estimated 36.8 percent of
the total population lives without access to
an improved water source.7 In rural areas,
access has increased steadily since 1990,
reaching 56.8 percent of the population by
2015. On the other hand, access has been
relatively higher but steadily decreasing
since 1990 in urban areas, dropping to 81.6
percent of the population in 2015. In order
to achieve higher efficiency, expanded
access, and improved service quality, Kenya
has joined many other countries in pursuing
a form of water privatization through the
commercialization of public water entities.
With the imposition of structural
adjustment programs by the World Bank and
5

10

Tove A. Larsen et al., “Emerging Solutions to the Water
Challenges of an Urbanizing World.” Science 352, no.
6288 (2016): 930.
6
Kenneth O. Nyangena, "Privatization of Water and
Sanitation Services in Kenya: Challenges and
Prospects," Africa Development 33, no. 4 (2008): 121.
7
“Data,” World Bank, 2016,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.H2O.SAFE.ZS?loca
tions=KE.

IMF in the 1980s in sub-Saharan Africa,
privatization became a major policy tool
intended to eliminate weak state enterprises
and enhance free markets.8 The potential
benefits of water privatization include
expansion of services to more users, cost
savings, enhanced quality and performance,
incentives to conserve water, encouragement
of private financing, and promotion of
technology transfer.9 Though the level of
private infrastructure investment generally
failed to meet expectations in sub-Saharan
Africa during the privatization wave, Kenya
has pursued a liberalization scheme that that
has partially shifted water management to
the private sector since 2002.10
The Ministry of Water Development,
now called the Ministry of Water and
Irrigation, was formed in 1963 to oversee
water resources and develop water policy. It
implemented water projects on a “self-help”
basis in which local communities
maintained control.11 Community
participation in water management expanded
in the 1980s, spurred by the growth of selfhelp community organizations, especially in
rural areas, and the harambee spirit of
working together fostered by the
government.12 By 2000, approximately 30
percent of rural Kenyans gained access to
8

Kate Bayliss and Terry McKinley, "Providing Basic
Utilities in Sub-Saharan Africa: Why Has Privatization
Failed?" Environment 49, no. 3 (2007): 26.; Nyangena,
"Privatization,” 118.
9
R. Quentin Grafton, James Horne, and Sarah Ann
Wheeler, "On the Marketisation of Water: Evidence from
the Murray-Darling Basin, Australia," Water Resources
Management 30, no. 3 (2015): 923-924.; Owiti A.
K'Akumu, "Sustainability Prospects for Water Utilities
Privatization in Kenya," International Journal of
Technology Management & Sustainable Development 5, no.
3 (2006): 272-273.; Nyangena, "Privatization,” 128.
10
Naren Prasad, "Privatisation Results: Private Sector
Participation in Water Services After 15
Years," Development Policy Review 24, no. 6 (2006): 669670.; Bayliss and McKinley, "Providing Basic Utilities,”26.
11
Nyangena, "Privatization,” 118.
12
Calvince Onditi, “Community Water Supply
Management Case Study: Nyasare Water Supply
Association in Migori County” (B.S. dissertation,
University of Nairobi, 2015), 2.
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safe, reliable water through the work of
small, community-based water systems.
National water policy was revised in 1999 to
establish municipal water and sewerage
departments (WSDs) that would be
responsible for supporting localized water
services.13 Although subject to major
political interference and competing claims
to management and authority, WSDs in
municipal governments were, at least in
theory, accountable to local people through
elections.
Beginning with the Water Act of 2002
and the subsequent Transfer of Water
Services Plan, the Kenyan government
adopted a water privatization scheme that
maintained public ownership but
commercialized services through the
adoption of private-sector business practices,
such as market pricing.14 The Act developed
the Water Resources Management Authority
to generally oversee and regulate allocation
of water resources. In this system, the Water
Services Regulatory Board (WSRB) issues
licenses to and sets pricing guidelines for
Water Services Boards (WSBs), which are
local and regional state institutions with
ownership of water infrastructure. WSBs are
handpicked by the local water Minister,
allowing significant personal discretion. The
WSBs in turn rely on Water Service
Providers (WSPs) to operate water
infrastructure as their agents.
Although this legal framework does
not guarantee water as a basic right to all, it
includes a statement recognizing water as a
human right not to be subordinated to the
dictates of economic principles.15 In order to
ensure public welfare, the Water Services
Trust Fund extends water services to those
that are not financially or geographically
favored. It does so by drawing upon public
13

11

K'Akumu, "Sustainability Prospects,” 272.; Nyangena,
"Privatization,” 119.
14
K'Akumu, "Sustainability Prospects,” 274.
15
Ibid.

and non-public funds, such as those from
development partners. In addition, the Water
Appeals Board adjudicates appeals of those
aggrieved by the decisions of actors in the
water economy. To ensure public
participation, the Water Act calls for a
National Water Services Strategy that
enables underserved communities to express
their needs; National Monitoring and
Information Systems to manage and
publicize information on water services; the
formation of Catchments Area Advisory
Committees; and public consultation on
water-related decisions.16
Major Challenges for Water Management
To understand some of the major
challenges to effective and equitable water
distribution, it is necessary to examine the
state of water governance, both formal and
informal, in Kenya. There is a lack of
coordination and data sharing between
government bodies; inadequate monitoring
and enforcement of water quality laws;
insufficient technical capacity for water
quality testing in rural areas; scarce financial
resources; and inadequate administrative and
technical management over water systems.17
Government appointments based on political
connections rather than merits and
competency can lead to corruption,
manipulation, restricted autonomy, job
insecurity, and uncertainty in water
institutions.18 In Kenya, these challenges are
compounded by rapid population growth,
urbanization, political instability,
unemployment, and ever-increasing water
16

Ibid 275.; Nyangena, "Privatization,” 122-123.
Georgia L. Kayser et al., "Drinking Water Quality
Governance: A Comparative Case Study of Brazil, Ecuador,
and Malawi," Environmental Science & Policy 48 (2015):
186.; Larsen et al., “Emerging Solutions,” 929-930.
18
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demand across many sectors.19 Lastly, there
is low awareness of water management law,
little enthusiasm for partnering with civil
society organizations, insufficient expertise
to negotiate with private companies, and
water loss from leakage and illegal
diversion.20 Public water utilities too often
find themselves in a vicious cycle of
deteriorating infrastructure, high system
losses, high costs, low revenue, and lowquality services in recent decades.21
Governance can also fail at the
household and individual level. The
capability of poor households to connect to
water can be undermined by fee policies,
transaction costs, housing and residency
status, insecure water supply, and
perceptions of water quality.22 A culture of
nonpayment for water services is prevalent
in rural settings, as well as some urban areas
and even among some government entities.23
In the end, governance failures can create
disincentives both “for the water supply
utility to connect poor households and for
poor households to choose to connect to the
water supply system.”24
Successful policy implementation
depends on alignment of objectives of
19

12

Emmanuel Manzungu et al., "Bulk Water Suppliers in
the City of Harare-An Endogenous Form of Privatisation of
Urban Domestic Water Supply in Zimbabwe?" Water
Alternatives 9, no. 1 (2016): 57.; Abu Shiraz Rahaman, Jeff
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Countries," Business and Society Review 118, no. 4 (2013):
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stakeholders and the degree of trust between
them. However, the failures of government
efforts, the rise of privatization, and a
systemic bias against the poor create a sense
of fear, distrust, and resentment.25 In a
model of distributive justice, the water
system should seek to provide the greatest
benefit to the least advantaged, rather than
hoping that benefits will eventually trickle
down to the poor.26 Instead, the decisionmakers, influencers, primary beneficiaries,
and corporate actors in water policy are
mainly men, and further divergences occur
relating to class, ethnicity, wealth, political
voice, age, education, and location.27
Women and children are the most vulnerable
to unintended consequences, yet the most
constrained to participate in the economy
and policymaking.
Across sub-Saharan Africa, the rural
water sector remains particularly
underdeveloped. Rural areas typically have
lower access to financial and technical
resources and greater problems collecting
data, coordinating with national actors,
carrying out maintenance and treatment, and
learning from peers.28 Like the most
disadvantaged urban areas, rural areas also
struggle with monitoring and enforcement of
water standards due to insufficient resources
and training.29 A clear bias for urban
populations is evident in the separation of
services, with more private sector
participation in urban areas and government
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provision to rural areas.30 To combat low
rural water access, NGOs funded by
international sources have multiplied and
helped build water infrastructure.31 Unlike in
cities, where informal actors fill gaps in
service, government-by-NGO has become a
growing trend in rural areas, sometimes
pressuring local governments to mimic
NGO approaches for local participation and
accountability.32 Through their position of
influence, NGOs have made governance of
water service provision more complex and
intertwined by blurring the lines between
policymaking and implementation roles.
At times, there are mismatches
between the priorities of county
governments and the needs of the poor. A
study of all county-level water policy
choices revealed that the water budget
consistently ranks fourth after health,
transport, and education.33 County water
ministries believe the fair tariff for water in
rural areas is 29 percent higher than in urban
areas, while the fair level of provision is 12
liters lower per person per day (at just 31
L/person/day) than for urban dwellers. Most
counties prefer to separate the
responsibilities for water services, sanitation,
and resource management, despite the
interconnected nature of water problems.
About 40 percent of counties believe
consumers should pay the full cost of water
provision, and 43 percent of those in favor
of subsidies do not believe it is the county
government’s financial responsibility. About
30 percent of county water ministries favor
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private sector involvement in water, and 70
percent do not consider community
management to be appropriate for rural areas.
In addition to this place-based variation in
government views, the needs of
communities can be subject to the whims of
election cycles and their relative political
influence within a county.
Performance of Privatized Water
Water privatization is often seen as a
central area of debate regarding water
solutions in developing countries. Thanks to
a wealth of research beginning in the 2000s,
scholars have come to agreement that
privatization of water theoretically should
but does not always lead to improved
performance in terms of profitability,
productivity, efficiency, and service
quality.34 In fact, private sector participation
has been shown to negatively affect
performance in some countries through
raising the cost of capital, reducing longterm investment in infrastructure repair and
replacement, and increasing corruption.35
Partial privatization in Kenya has been
accompanied by a lack of commitment to
low-income consumers, inequity in the
quality of service based on the ability to pay,
and service cut-offs.36
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A survey of households in the city of
Kisumu paint a vivid example of the
limitations of Kenya’s privatization solution
thus far. As of 2010, the survey revealed that
only 25 percent of households in Kisumu,
Kenya’s third largest city, access the World
Bank’s minimum recommended daily
requirement, which is 50 liters per capita for
drinking, cooking, and personal hygiene
within a reasonable distance from the
home.37 Low- and middle-income
households generally access less than 50
percent of the basic water requirement.38
It has become clear that water pricing and
privatization does not necessarily improve
the poor’s access to clean water in Kenya,
unless it is accompanied with good
governance, sufficient financing, equitable
pricing and distribution policies, and
participatory approaches. Despite the
immense challenges to clean water access
and the flaws of privatization, certain steps
can be taken to improve access to clean
water in Kenya, including the empowerment
of community-based water management
strategies for more rural areas.
Community-Based Management: A Path
Forward
Asset-based community development
is an evolution of community development
thinking, which was first grounded in a
rights-based approach. Generally, to build
an enabling environment to promote and
protect human rights, this approach to
development explicitly pursues
accountability, participation, nondiscrimination, and attention to vulnerable
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groups.39 Participatory rural appraisal (PRA),
an approach that took hold in the 1970s and
1980s, invites community members to codesign projects, but does not necessarily
arise from or result in citizen-led initiatives.
PRA can perpetuate the emphasis on needs
and limitations and take place alongside “the
subliminal belief that outside institutions
exclusively hold the expertise, resources,
and power to resolve issues.”40 The
sustainable livelihoods approach (SLA)
integrates PRA methodologies to ensure the
relevance of economic development
programs to communities. Introduced in
early 1990s, SLA departs from PRA by
inviting communities to identify their assets
and allies. ABCD expands the conversation
beyond economic activities to consider
social capital, as well as networks that are
inclusive for women and other marginalized
groups. Overall, the conversation is moving
from carrying out development for people or
with people, to by the people themselves.
ABCD is oriented toward citizens and
communities as the primary producers of
internal development solutions. ABCD
draws upon local residents’ insights, skills,
and resources, thereby increasing the
effectiveness of outside support.41 Typically,
ABCD involves participatory and inclusive
mapping and planning exercises in which
residents locate, connect, and build upon the
assets of the community as a whole. Strong
social capital results in a greater sense of
responsibility towards others (including
marginalized groups) and a better likelihood
of reaching internal solutions to local
problems. Government agencies, NGOs,
community-based organizations, faith
communities, and businesses can be strong
partners in ABCD.
The ABCD approach can still suffer
from some of the broader challenges to
39
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water management in rural Kenya and
unique challenges to community-based
approaches. One study of a community
water project in Kisayani community in
Kathyaka Location, Makueni County, for
example, revealed challenges to sustainable
water supply, regulatory policy, and local
management after 10 years of operation.42
Changing rainfall patterns, increasing
withdrawals, resistance to water sector
reforms, reduced cohesion between
community and management, and
insufficient supportive external relationships
are some of the limitations that this project
may share with others like it. Another study
of five community water projects in the
upper Ewaso Ng’iro River basin of Mount
Kenya also points out the pressures of
hydroclimatic change and population growth,
as well as water inequality and institutional
homogeneity across the different water
projects.43
Just as the major challenges to water
management in Kenya have created a
vicious cycle, small adjustments in various
areas of water governance can spur a
feedback loop that builds effectiveness.44 A
greater degree of community participation,
with the aspiration to reach ABCD, is one
such adjustment. In order to build trust, the
government and private-sector partners must
encourage participatory approaches to better
understand local preferences and facilitate
knowledge-sharing opportunities between
neighboring areas and communities with
strong examples of ABCD. The Nyasare
Water and Sanitation Company and
Makutano Community Development

15

42
Harry Spaling, Geoffery Brouwer, and Jesse Njoka,
“Factors Affecting the Sustainability of a Community
Water Supply Project in Kenya,” Development in Practice
24, no. 7 (2014): 797-799.
43
Jampel Dell’Angelo et al., “Community Water
Governance on Mount Kenya: An Assessment Based on
Ostrom’s Design Principles of Natural Resource
Management,” Mountain Research and Development 36,
no. 1 (2016): 102.
44
Kayser et al., "Drinking Water,” 192.

Association are two such examples. While
only a handful of publicly-available case
studies are considered in this paper, they
demonstrate multiple strategies for
successful long-term community water
projects taken to scale.
Case Study: Nyasare Water and
Sanitation Company
Nyasare Water and Sanitation
Company (NYAWASCO), formerly the
Nyasare Water Supply Association (NWSA),
offers a strong model of ABCD principles in
action. The project was designed and is
managed by residents of the rural Nyasare
community, located along the Nyasare River
Valley to the north and west of Migori Town
in Migori County, Kenya.45 The project was
initiated in 1989 largely in response to the
catalytic leadership of Reverend Peter
Indalo of the local Oyani Christian Rural
Service Church, who assisted in the creation
of a self-help group to improve water access
and safety.46 Residents of Nyasare sought to
increase their resilience to water shortages
and waterborne diseases. NWSA began
official operation in 1994, was designed to
serve 10,000 people, and has since expanded
to cover more than 30,000 people across
rural areas and Migori Town. In response to
reforms of the water sector in the new
Kenyan Constitution of 2010, NWSA
transformed into a water company
(NYAWASCO) and is recognized as a
community-managed WSP.
The organizational structure of
NYAWASCO gives ultimate power to an
Assembly of local residents. This Assembly
is composed of approximately 1,200
registered community members that enjoy
the benefits of the company.47 The members
can vote at annual meetings, submit
45
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proposals, and be appointed to leadership
roles within the organization. Members
participate in external events, fundraising
activities, and direct outreach to the larger
community. The Assembly elects members
of the Executive Committee every three
years, as well as approves all plans and
activities of NYAWASCO. Such activities
include outreach, tree planting, and
participation at the Migori Agricultural
Show. The Assembly approves all financial
commitments, such as those relating to
operations, maintenance, and salaries. Lastly,
the Assembly can work with the Executive
Committee to engage with the Water
Services Trust Fund, the local WSB, and the
WRMA to improve services.

16

Figure 1. NYAWASCO’s organizational chart
reveals its accountability to the Assembly of
community members.
Source: Adapted from Onditi, “Community Water,”
32-37.

The Management Committee convenes
an Executive Committee, Zonal Committee,
and Management Staff. The Executive
Committee is composed of eight elected
leaders, and the Zonal Committee brings
together elected representatives from the six
zones of the water supply area.48 The Zonal
Representatives support community
mobilization, awareness, implementation,
and relay the perspectives and concerns of
residents to the Executive Committee. Also
at the grassroots level, NYAWASCO
established a Communal Water Committee
that convenes a Catchment Protection
Committee and a Water Outlets Committee.
These committees take responsibility for the
following activities: catchment area land
purchase and fencing; monitoring and tree
planting in catchment zones; training on
sustainable farming practices; and outreach
through local associations to raise awareness
about catchment area management. To build
awareness about catchment protection,
NYAWASCO specifically engages with
schools, assemblies of local chiefs and
elders, and women’s groups. Water is
distributed at communal drawing points (at a
weekly rate), water kiosks (at a rate per
cubic meter, half of which is paid to
NYAWASCO), or through individual
metered connections (at a tiered rate per
cubic meter based on total volume). Groundlevel management staff, called caretakers,
are local residents that are trained and
employed by NYAWASCO.
Community participation was a key
component for making collective decisions
about water sources and pricing. In addition
to a borehole, NYAWASCO has developed
springs and shallow wells in the community.
After community meetings, eight
48
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community members voluntarily donated
land to NYAWASCO in order to protect and
develop springs in exchange for free water
supply.49 The community was also
mobilized to discuss water provision at
higher elevations not served by the gravitybased distribution system. NYAWASCO
dug five shallow, hand-pumped wells to
provide this water, after discussing
appropriate solutions and locations with
residents of these areas. The community
allocated three wells to primary schools and
one well to a health center. Community
members came to agreement that this water
would be free, but these institutions would
contribute to maintenance, when needed,
conducted by the shallow well committee.
NYAWASCO has major achievements
in addition to upholding community
governance. Although unprotected water
sources are still available to residents,
NYAWASCO has helped reduce the
prevalence of waterborne diseases like
cholera and typhoid, while making the
distance to water sources far shorter.50
During its operation for more than two
decades, NYAWASCO has grappled with
enormous challenges that range from water
supply seasonality, catchment area
degradation, infrastructural vandalisms,
unpaid water bills, water quality issues,
incapacity to expand water facilities to meet
the growing demand, and lack of finances.51
Nonetheless, the Association has sustained
reliable water supply since its inception, and
the community has witnessed increased
groundwater recharge, vegetation cover, and
water table levels.
NYAWASCO has shifted away from
an approach that relied heavily on outside
assistance. Initially, Reverend Indalo
catalyzed the community to leverage outside
funding. Through religious ties with an
49

17

50
51

Onditi, “Community Water,” 28.
Ibid 57.
Ibid 62-65.

Austrian church, he forged an external link
with the Austrian Development Cooperation, which provided funding during
the early stages of the project.52 Up until
2007, NYAWASCO invited local and
international consultants and implementing
partners to provide technical and
administrative assistance. However,
NYAWASCO shifted to full selfmanagement in the past decade, achieving
financial stability and greater community
participation.
Due to its ongoing success despite its
obstacles, NYAWASCO has become a
regional role model and collaborator,
sharing best practices with a self-help group
based nearby in Nyamira County. The group,
called the Hopewell-Keroka Alliance,
shared a similar path with NYAWASCO,
including its founding through a prominent
community member, a resident-led approach,
and a partnership with a foreign funding
partner, in this case a sister community in
the United States. The Hopewell-Keroka
Alliance is pursuing the creation of a local
water company modeled after NYAWASCO.
Case Study: Makutano Community
Development Association
The Makutano Community
Development Association (MCDA), located
in the Ikombe Division of Yatta District,
offers a model of ABCD on a larger scale.
Spurred by Raphael Masika, a local resident
with experience in community-based
development, a group of 60 people from
neighboring villages met in 1995 to discuss
community associations.53 Already having
52
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the precedent of community burial societies,
the residents registered as a self-help group
and then as a community-based organization
(CBO) the following year. Also in 1996, the
first indigenous philanthropic institution in
the country, the Kenya Community
Development Foundation (KCDF), began
operation. Both MCDA and KCDF
committed early on to ABCD principles,
working to harness local assets and build the
capacity of local people to guide their own
development. By 1998, MCDA approached
KCDF for a grant to establish an office, hire
staff, and conduct training, as well as initiate
an in-depth planning process. Over three
years, more than 20 villages elected liaisons
to work with local consultants and host open
meetings with immediate community
members. The result was a collective action
plan to address various priorities, which has
served as the compass of MCDA for more
than a decade.
At the foundation of MCDA’s
structure are local CBOs, village
development committees, and general
community members. MCDA’s membership
grew from 10 informal associations to 84
independent CBOs and 210 villages
representing more than 77,000 people.54
Trained volunteer community mobilizers
liaise between communities and MCDA’s
two staff members, unpaid elected board
members, and a volunteer patron.55 Each
affiliated CBO runs independently, with its
own elections and finances, and may initiate
or respond to broader MCDA initiatives.
The MCDA provides CBOs with technical,
coordination-related, or financial assistance.
A strong theme in MCDA’s work is tapping
into local resources. MCDA may distribute
larger grants among CBOs, but the CBOs
54
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typically provide their own local monetary
contributions, labor, expertise, and materials.
When outside experts are required, MCDA
ensures that local residents receive a
comprehensive training on the relevant topic.
Moreover, MCDA’s operating expenses are
funded by membership fees for individual
residents, which enables members to vote
for their representatives and enjoy
preferential pricing for some programs.
Rather than pursuing NGO status, MCDA
chose to remain a CBO in order to uphold
the ownership, engagement, and
contributions of members.
MCDA Organizational Structure
Patron
Board of Trustees
Board of Directors (Management Board)
Director/Coordinator
Programme Officer
Community Mobilizers ßà Water Technicians
CBOs – VDCs – General Community

Figure 2. MCDA’s organizational chart reveals its
accountability to its affiliated CBOs, VDCs, and
members.
Source: Adapted from Mahomed and Peters, “The
Story Behind the Well.”

The unanimous top priority identified
by residents in the 1998 baseline survey was
water. During the planning process, MCDA
created a map of 26 future water points.56
Since then, MCDA has constructed 9
community-managed dams and 17
sub‑service wells, as well as supported
supplementary household-level water
harvesting. Each of these 26 water points is
overseen by a water management committee
that is elected by local users and operates as
an independent CBO. MCDA assists with
56
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management and accounting training, as
well as ensures gender equity in committee
membership. Similar to MCDA, each CBO
covers maintenance costs through an annual
or daily user fee. Where communal land is
not available, members of the water point
negotiate for donated land from the group
and volunteer to clear the land. MCDA
works with the local authorities to conduct
an Environmental Impact Assessment and
helps pair CBOs with partners for
management and accounting training,
planning, design, and funding. In the case of
the water points, AusAid and the Irish
government through Concern Universal
were major donors. Once constructed, water
point members rotate in supervising the
wells, hire a permanent dam caretaker, and
follow their own maintenance plan. MCDA
assists with water testing in Nairobi on an
annual basis. Most households in the area,
whether MCDA members or not, now
belong to a water point.
To support this work and MCDA’s
other projects, KCDF, in alignment with its
own practice of matching external funds
with local sources, began offering
community-level endowment funds. In 2006,
MCDA established a community fund that is
invested and matched 1:1 by KCDF.57
MCDA’s members contributed
approximately $6,500, which grew to more
than $23,000 by 2010. Once the fund
doubles to $56,000, a committee of elected
members will begin drawing on the proceeds
for MCDA initiatives.
MCDA embodies ABCD in multiple
regards, including its structure, holistic
approach, and vision. MCDA’s structure and
processes are unique in how they promote
distributed decision-making, accountability,
and transparency, which further builds
community cohesion, trust, mutual-help
behaviors, collective action, and pooling of
resources. In addition to its water projects,

19

MCDA is committed to sustainable
development across sectors. Among
numerous other programs, MCDA has built
162 pit latrines, a 23-kilometer road, a
secondary school, and an extensive food
security and preservation initiative.58 The
shared vision for MCDA developed by its
members in 1998 set in motion a community
effort that has leveraged and nurtured
significant social capital.
A study of MCDA and the factors
influencing its performance reveals the key
role of the operational style and mission
developed by community members. Surveys
of MCDA and its 84 affiliated CBOs
revealed that the mission, organizational
competency, political capital, and funding
resources all play a major role, accounting
for 63.2 percent of the variation in CBO
performance.59 Performance is considered a
CBO’s contribution to building residents’
access to financial, physical, and human
resources, as well as economic opportunities
and political power. In particular,
organizational mission had the strongest
positive relationship with performance.
Respondents noted the importance of a clear,
specific, and tangible mission statement that
reflects clients’ needs and is tied to a
participatory strategic decision-making
process. Organizational competency, which
includes staff experience, stable and active
leadership, and mutual trust, had the next
strongest effect on building an environment
that improves CBO performance.
Role of Outside Actors
The ABCD approach does not
disregard the importance of outside
assistance, but calls for outside partners to
play a support role to citizen-led community
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development.60 Often, ABCD does not occur
spontaneously within a community. A
helpful approach is for outside actors to
regard themselves and their work as
catalysts for community development. This
external stimulus can and should be minimal,
to avoid any sense of dependence. Catalysts
such as NGOs can help facilitate a process
of mapping assets and eventually leveraging
external resources, rather than directly
implementing solutions.61 Outsiders can also
promote inclusion by helping convene a
more representative group of residents,
instead of summoning a small number of
leaders.62 Critically, outside organizations
seek to build trust and understanding:
Catalysts are accountable to local
communities. They are there, in some
form or another, only at the
invitation of the community. But as
outsiders, they are upfront about
their role and intentions so everyone
in can see their purpose and
understand their motives. In doing so,
a creative sense of ‘obedience’ to the
community is established. Catalysts
are consistent: they do what they say
they are going to do. They are
transparent: they are forth-coming
about their actions and are open to
being questioned about them.63
Until the financial capacity of local
organizations and governments are sufficient
to take over, international funding for water
projects will remain critical. Nonetheless,
NGOs and external donors can shift their
goals toward community-building and local
ownership of development projects. In this
way, outside partners can assist with funding
and technical expertise, while also
60
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increasing trust, communication, and mutual
respect.64 Outsiders might also have the
unique opportunity to attract government
attention. In a win-win situation, outside
funding for a community could encourage
elected officials to also dedicate or match
funding and technical assistance to local
projects. Therefore, there is higher
accountability, a greater diversity of funding
sources, and political empowerment of
residents.
Meanwhile, the Kenyan government
and private water suppliers can also play an
important role in catalyzing ABCD. For
example, they can set benchmarks for equity
and report regularly on them, in order to
increase the attention paid to the most
vulnerable consumers. In addition to sharing
more information overall, the government
and private sector can promote shared
motives with stakeholders and create room
for communities to engage in decisionmaking.65 Instead of applying a uniform
pricing system across the country, Kenya
could increase flexibility and transparency
in matching tariffs and subsidies to the
specific economic characteristics of
communities.66 The government and outside
partners can help train local leaders about
community water and sanitation governance,
as well as offer ongoing support in the areas
of monitoring, planning, capacity-building,
and specialized technical assistance. Lastly,
the government can help communities
leverage outside funding, especially through
64
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the Kenyan diaspora and innovative
international crowdfunding mechanisms.
Conclusion
Given a strong level of engagement,
capacity-building, and political will, Kenya
can leverage its semi-privatized water
system and tradition of community-based
projects to make water available, accessible,
adequate, safe, and affordable for more
underserved communities. NYAWASCO
and MCDA provide strong models of ABCD
approaches for water management in rural
Kenya. By empowering local organizations
in other communities, the country can
continue to diversify approaches to sustain
healthy communities and work to effectively
channel limited resources, combat
corruption, leverage outside funding, and
achieve equitable water systems.
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OUR
ENVIRONMENT:
A HEALTH
CRISIS AND
WHAT WE MUST
DO TO HEAL IT
JUSTIN MCCARTNEY
Abstract

24

As efforts across the globe to curb the future
destruction of climate change continue to
evolve, it is important to recognize that we
are already seeing the dangerous effects of a
damaged environment. Our health and
mental well-being are being threatened as
we continue to release harmful chemicals
into our atmosphere. Studies have suggested
that millions more people across the world
are in danger of environmental-related
health crises in the coming decades unless
there is dramatic and meaningful change in
the way we approach protecting our
environment. Policy endeavors are being
made at the international level, as seen with
the Paris Agreement and recent UN
Environmental Assembly negotiations, as
well as at the Congressional and state
legislature level here in the United States
and elsewhere; however, the continued
struggle against a powerful lobby has yet to
yield the type of drastic resolutions that have
been proposed in order to successfully
combat the threat of climate change and
rapid environmental degradation. This
article will more deeply examine exactly
how the pollution of our air and negligence
in valuing green spaces is harming human
health; and what needs to be done to stop
these processes and save lives.

Introduction

Our environment has no shortage of
enthusiastic defenders. Propositions for oil
pipelines arouse thousands of demonstrators;
an ad to save the polar bears will always
strike at hearts; the appointment of a
science-denier to a federal Cabinet position
can bring out the full force of activists and
non-profit advertising campaigns. Yet, this
still is not enough if we are to actualize the
large-scale change we so fervently advocate
for in regards to mediating environmental
change. The most basic reason, in simplest
terms, is that we need everyone. We need
every single person to care as passionately
about saving our planet as the most inspired
activist. This, of course, is impractical; at
least under the current framing of this
environmental crisis we care so much about.
This is essentially because we frame the
issue of climate change and environmental
degradation as just that: an issue area. It is
one of many to be tacked on to the political
speeches of progressive candidates, or a
specialization area for a legislative aide. It is
limited in such a framework. This article
will not go deep into the social aspects of
how or why this is so; however, I hope to
offer one perspective on why framing the
crisis we face in such a manner is, literally,
deadly.
Our neglect for our natural
environment, manifested through increasing
effects of climate change and the destruction
of our ecosystems and atmosphere, has led
to an unimaginable degree of both explicit
and implicit health problems on human
populations around the globe. While the
connection between climate change and our
health is often overlooked and not fully
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understood, the impacts are widespread and
pose dangerous omens for our future. An
unhealthy environment can mean anything
from increased likelihood for Lyme’s
disease to skin cancer to depression. Nearly
23% of all deaths globally can be attributed
to some kind of environmental factor.1 This
fact itself should inspire nothing less than an
urgent call to action against the harmful
effects of climate change and environmental
destruction. The remainder of this article
will examine a wide variety of health effects
due to the environment, as well as offer a
look at some ways in which we can reframe
the crisis into successful action towards a
sustainable future.
Section One: Health Effects of Climate
Change and Environmental Degradation

25

In building the argument for radical
action to combat climate change, one has to
commit to getting creative in constructing
narratives which will spur such action. That
is precisely why former EPA Administrator,
Gina McCarthy, made it a special priority to
emphasize the health implications of climate
change and environmental degradation
during her time in the Agency. She visited
health schools, encouraging medical
students to consider joining the EPA rather
than pursue a traditional medical career.2
The goal was to transform the image of the
Agency, and, effectively, the movement
itself to be more than a “tree-hugger” cause
and into an intersectional profession of
social justice and medical necessity.2 In her
own words, “I’ve always thought of myself
as a public health person, I still do”.2
McCarthy believed that this mission of
public health was in fact central to the
Agency and was infused into every bit of its
work, even if that tended to be lost on the
general public. After all, the work of
environmentalism, just as in public health, is
to build up the quality of life for

communities across the world. The
intersections of health and environmental
change support this proposed inherent link,
and our work to promote protection of the
environment should internalize this critical
connection. The following sections describe
just how our environment influences various
aspects of our health.
Disease
One of the major fields of impact on
health from environmental change is that of
proliferating various diseases. Per the World
Health Organization, the attributable
fraction of a risk factor is the percentage
decline in disease or injury due to changing
conditions for the risk.1 So, for example, the
attributable fraction of the environment on
malaria is 42%; meaning that 42% of cases
of malaria could be prevented if the
environmental conditions were changed in a
way that reduced the risk.1 The sheer degree
to which the environment can statistically be
shown to influence diseases such as malaria
serves as a poignant snapshot into just how
much overlap there is between the
environment and infection; and these effects
are, in fact, discriminatory: more developing
countries, specifically in sub-Saharan Africa,
are disproportionately affected due to
environment-related disease.1
Water-Related Diseases
The climate influences growth,
expansion, survival, transmission, and
virulence of various water-borne pathogens
which lead to diseases such as diarrhea.3 As
temperatures become increasingly
fluctuating, precipitation rates change, water
salinity is altered from runoff, the disease’s
spatial and temporal range are affected; this
means the possibility for increased exposure
rates. Some other diseases that can be
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amplified by these factors are diarrhea,
schistosomiasis, cholera, and salmonella.3,4
The disease most profoundly affected
by environmental factors is diarrhea.
Approximately 94% of the global disease
burden of diarrhea is attributable to the
environment.1 Diarrhea is a water-related
illness, and therefore is sensitive to changes
in water quality and sanitation.4 This
explains the degree of burden associated
with environmental factors for this particular
disease, as environmental destruction often
affects the quality of water for the
surrounding region. Additionally, rising
temperatures and increased humidity, as
well as invariability of rainfall contribute to
the spread of diarrheal disease; these factors
alone have been estimated to cause a
possible 8-11% spike in cases globally.4 A
prime case study of this phenomenon can be
seen in the Ganges River region, where
hundreds of cities upriver are dumping raw
sewage into a source of drinking water for
over 400 million people farther down the
river, endangering the drinkability of the
water and greatly risking infection.4
Schistosomiasis affects hundreds of
millions of people a year, and leads to
malnutrition, stunting of growth, and
subsequent loss of productivity in the
workplace or at school.4 It can also lead to
the spread of HIV/AIDS. This disease is
influenced by factors like the increase in
freshwater snails resulting from river
fragmentation and biodiversity loss, as well
as eutrophication and overfishing, all
resulting from human-induced changes to
the environment.4 The examples of both
diarrhea and schistosomiasis speak to the
multiplicity of ways that environmental
change, whether it be from lack of safe
drinking water or damage to biodiversity,
can have substantial negative effects on
health in quite potent ways. Another
situation of disease from water-related
climate change effects stems from harmful

algal blooms. Algal blooms are formed by
an increase in algae or cyanobacteria in
bodies of water, which often lead to a
depletion of oxygen and decline in life in
those bodies. They also pose a threat to
human health. The cyanobacteria present
from algal blooms can release toxins which
cause liver, neurological, digestive, and skin
disease.4 Additionally, diatoms, a type of
algae which contribute to this depletion of
oxygen in marine environments, produce
domoic acid, a potent neurotoxin which can
bioaccumulate in shellfish and finfish, and
later impact human health as these
organisms are consumed.3 Algal blooms
have been an acute effect of environmental
degradation, as increasing temperatures and
pollution have disturbed the equilibrium in
many marine ecosystems across the world.
Vector-Borne Diseases
Another pathway for a changing
environment to influence the spread of
disease is through vector-borne disease.
Vector-borne diseases are primarily
transmitted by “blood-sucking arthropods,”
also known as mosquitoes and ticks.3
Diseases transmitted in this fashion include
malaria, ebola, dengue fever, and
Chikungunya fever.3 The risk for this type of
disease is affected when the conditions for
the vectors become more favorable, or
interaction between human populations and
vector populations are forced into closer
proximity. This occurs with forest loss and
loss of plant diversity, along with changes in
temperature, humidity, and rainfall.3 For
example, outbreaks of ebola have been
suggested to be linked to intense
deforestation in Africa, which has destroyed
the habitat for bats, the natural hosts of the
disease. Because of this habitat destruction,
the bats were forced to alter their migration
patterns which put them in closer proximity
with human populations, and increased
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likelihood of outbreaks.4 Separately,
mosquito populations can increase in areas
which experience a period of drought
followed by a period of rewetting; this
affects the water table, vegetation, and
aquatic predators. Therefore, the highest risk
area for infection is where human population
is high, there is ongoing ecological
disruption such as changes in land use or
agricultural practices, and where the human
and mosquito populations overlap.4 As the
climate changes, different areas will become
more suitable for these vectors; for example,
tick populations will likely be able to
expand northward in North America.4 The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
projects that 200 million more people will at
risk for exposure to malaria with current
expectations under climate change.4
As rainfall increases in various areas
of the globe, and hotter and drier conditions
afflict others, the potential for these types of
diseases to spread and infect new
populations from Chicago to Botswana
increases in dangerous ways.3 One of the
chief actions which should be taken in the
effort to prevent such a catastrophe would
be to learn more about the relations between
these diseases and effects of climate change
or environmental destruction. Many of the
studies currently suggest what are
oftentimes nonlinear and only “likely”
influences. A degree of this speaks to the
complex ways in which environmental
factors impact disease agents, but other
reasons include a simple lack of research
into the subject. The gap speaks to the
absence of overlap between environment
and health professional fields; research
continues to be siloed. A better
understanding of the causes would allow us
to more intelligently combat their effects.
Pollution

27

Our human health can also be affected
by pollution, whether it be directly from air
pollution or indirectly from consequences of
chemical pollutants. Pollution historically
has been a major human-induced threat to
environmental health; now, we are finding
that not only has it been a detriment to our
natural ecosystems, but it persists as a potent
threat to human health in a variety of ways
as well.
Air Pollution
Air pollution is an increasingly
significant direct agent of danger to human
health as we continue our pollutive habits
and fall short in cleaning up our atmosphere.
Pollution of our atmosphere damages both
human and environmental health.
Concerning human health, it can manifest
itself in a few different ways. The first way
is through indoor air pollution. This comes
about as a result of incomplete combustion
of solid fuels, most prominently in
developing nations where coal, wood, and
charcoal make up a greater percentage of
energy sources.4 The specific health effects
resulting from indoor air pollution include
respiratory infections, chronic obstructive
pulmonary disorder, stroke, and heart
disease.4 Between 2.6 and 4.4 million people
die per year from indoor air pollution, most
of whom are women and children.4 Over 2.8
billion are exposed. As a relatively underappreciated subset of pollution effects,
indoor air pollution continues to have
dramatic impacts on human health. Once
again, lack of understanding and connection
between inefficient energy sourcing and
regular causes of death or illness have
proven an obstacle to confronting this issue.
Air pollution is also a danger when it
is in the open atmosphere. Ground level
ozone is one example: methane emissions
can cause the photochemical reactions
which produce ozone to occur in the
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troposphere, the lowest dimension of Earth’s
atmosphere.3 This leads to cardiopulmonary
mortality, along with crop reduction and
decreased forest growth which can further
affect health.3,4 It is suggested that nearly
half of the deaths from the historic 2003
heatwave in Europe could actually have
been caused by ozone exposure, intensified
by the increased temperature and sunlight,
rather than directly heat-related causes.3
Aeroallergens are another cause of human
health effects under the umbrella of air
pollution, specifically affecting individuals
with asthma and exacerbating those
conditions. These allergens, like fungal
spores or plant pollen, increase with warmer
weather and earlier flowering of some
grasses.3 Droughts in particular can
exacerbate allergen effects by spreading dust
and pollen or spores. This specifically can
expand the reach of these allergens, as winds
carry the agents to new populations.
China provides a useful, if tragic,
example when examining health effects of
air pollution. According to a study from the
University of California-Berkeley, air
pollution kills around four thousand people a
day in China, in the form of heart, lung,
stroke, or other complications.5 One in six
premature deaths in the country are due to
air pollution, and approximately 38% of the
population lives in conditions where the air
is considered “unhealthy” by U.S. EPA
standards.5 The smog is visible and very
evident for people concerned with China’s
pollution problem; the degree of the
underlying health effects it is having on the
Chinese people is much less obvious and
much more critical to understand if urgency
is going to be stressed in addressing the
country’s polluting problem.
When translating the disabilityadjusted life years due to particle air
pollution, this epidemic costs approximately
$1.9 trillion a year, or 2.7% of the global
economy.3 It would make sense that the

world should be willing to pay at least that,
to prevent economic losses; however, we are
still facing a growing threat from air
pollution, one which has far-reaching effects
on health across the globe.
Toxic Chemicals
Pollution does not just equate solely to
air pollution, however. Exposure to toxic
chemicals is another important health issue.
This can become a problem through either
inhaling, eating, or drinking polluted
substances, especially as chemicals become
bioaccumulated along a food chain.4
Chemicals such as pesticides from
agricultural runoff, heavy metals used in
cement, electronics recycling,
pharmaceutical pollution, mercury and
heavy metals in coal and oil combustion,
and more all factor into a global crisis of
exposure to dangerously unhealthy toxins as
a result of careless waste.4 What this looks
like across the world includes lead poisoning,
especially in low-income countries, illness
from pesticides due to exposure during
agricultural work, and mercury poisoning
from aquatic food sources.4 Some of the
effects of these pollutants range from
endocrine disruption to cancer risk, to
neurobehavioral disorders.4 Another
component to this issue is, once again, the
absence of certifiable information. Of 300
chemicals which are currently in produced
in high quantities, only about half have
sufficient info on toxicity and health
impacts.4 With this dire information lack, we
cannot even know the full extent to which
dangerous chemicals that have been
carelessly disposed of in our natural
environment are affecting our health. If we
are to properly address the root cause of
these health impacts, it is critical to have a
deeper awareness of precisely what the most
effective actions will be in future policy.
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Food Security and Nutrition

29

Threats to adequate food access have
been exacerbated under climate change.
With land degradation and development for
agriculture and soil erosion, we are left with
a loss of pollinators and increased exposure
to pesticides.4 Soil itself is becoming
unsuitable for crop growing as it is overused
and the nutrients are depleted; this affects
not only food production but increases
likelihood of flooding, destroys biodiversity,
and eliminates a critical carbon sink to offset
emissions of greenhouse gases.4 Crop yields
are vulnerable to changing temperatures,
especially temperature variability which we
are seeing increasing cases of in various
parts of the world.4 The shift in rainfall
patterns as a result of climate change has
affected crop yield and changed in what
regions certain crops can grow as well. This
leads not only to overall scarcity from
decreased yield but also to nutrient
deficiencies as a result of lost crops. With
this critical threat to crop yield and nutrition,
human populations are facing a barrage of
health effects. Lack of overall food
availability implicates a range of further
health consequences, as does lack of proper
nutrient intake.
Diminishing freshwater availability is
another factor to be considered. A
combination of overdrawing from
underground aquifers and climate change
has led to massive losses in crops.4
Persistent droughts have played a large role
in this loss. Water usage is also highly
dependent on which type of food source is
being produced. For example, beef requires
eleven times the irrigation water per calorie
than does poultry, eggs, or pork.4 Water
scarcity in itself is a dire threat to
communities as well; like food insecurity, it
can mean subsequent health complications
in addition to the threat from lack of water
itself.

Besides crop yield, another issue
surrounding food security is the threat to
fisheries. Overfishing, warming waters, and
acidification negatively affect marine life.
Ocean acidification, which has risen
substantially since the Industrial Revolution,
causes shellfish like mussels and clams, and
corals, to grow softer shells and skeletons
which have greatly impacted their ability to
survive.4 This means less food, especially
for the growing number of people who are
living near coastlines and derive much of
their food stock from the oceans.
A particular issue with negative
environmental effects on food availability is
the fact that demand is, in fact, increasing.
Roughly 40% of the global population is
projected to be living in river basin regions
which are under severe stress.4 Agriculture
and the raising of livestock intensify this
pressure, which can not only lead to food
shortages but a lack in basic water
availability and economic impacts as well.
The situation now, therefore, is an
intensifying threat from climate change and
environmental destruction coupled with a
growing stress on the global food stock in
historically unprecedented levels.4
Climate Change and Weather - Direct
Effects
Direct effects of climate change on
human health include heat related effects,
extreme weather events, and exposure to
increased radiation. These impacts are
unique because they can be felt as a direct
result of a changing climate, even if they are
often not attributed to such a cause. Many
direct effects are not simple to attribute
specifically to climate change. However,
trends and changes in normal expectations
help us to monitor approximately the degree
of the effect that climate change is wreaking
on human health.
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First, there is the issue of heat related
incidences. A study in Australia showed the
ratio of summer to winter deaths in the
country has steadily risen between 1968 and
2010.3 This figure certainly does not prove
any type of causality, but it does begin to
hint at a trend. Climate change can affect
health through heat exhaustion (where the
body temperature rises above 38°C) which
can cause physical and cognitive impairment,
or heat stroke (where the body temperature
rises above 40.6°C) which can result in
organ damage, unconsciousness, and even
death.3 Another factor in this is the
vulnerability of certain populations. First of
all, with milder winters, there is a general
higher likelihood of being impacted by heat,
as seen during the 2003 European heat wave,
which was preceded by a markedly mild
winter.3 Urban populations are also under
increased threat to heat-related incidences,
as cities experience enhanced temperature
rises. Finally, age, gender, and physical
activity are also all characteristics which
may exacerbate a heat wave’s effects on
health.
Another direct impact of climate
change on human health comes in the form
of natural disasters. For every one person
killed in a natural disaster, an estimated
additional one thousand are negatively
affected.4 Floods are the most common and
deadly natural disaster, and are increasing in
frequency due to the effects of climate
change on our planet.3 Floods cause not only
drowning, but hypothermia and are often
spread infectious diseases. These sorts of
events not only impact immediate health and
wellness, but can lead to long-term change.
For example, floods often lead to
contaminated drinking water due to
overflowing sewage, fostering an
environment for vector-borne diseases, and
loss of livelihood and assets causing mental
distress.3

30

As the ozone layer of our atmosphere is
threatened by our growing emissions, direct
effects from sun exposure have been found
to increase. Radiation caused by this
deterioration contributes to more cases of
skin cancer and cataracts.3 In a US study,
cases of squamous cell carcinoma rose 5.5%
for 1°C of average temperature rise.3 What
this equates to is essentially an additional 2%
dose of UV radiation for every single degree
Celsius in average temperature rise.3 Going
outdoors in summertime has become more
of a threat than in previous times as heat
threats increase and the strength of UV
radiation creates increasingly greater risks to
health.
Mental Health
Mental health may be a particularly
overlooked and underappreciated result of
increasing climate change impacts, but this
perception is certainly not for lack of
tangible effect. One of the most significant
relations of environmental change and
mental health is displacement and
destruction of one’s home. Leaving one’s
home and familiar surroundings, loss of
possessions, breaking social ties, absence of
mental health services, and the difficulty of
resettlement are all additional factors which
could negatively impact mental health for
peoples displaced or otherwise affected by
environmental disaster.4 While the total
degree of displacement due to climate
change and related causes is unknown, the
adverse mental health effects are more clear.
Depression and post-traumatic stress
disorder are common results of natural
disaster and conflict related to
environmental factors. Sexual violence is
another tragic effect of conflict and disaster
which can be attributed to climate in certain
situations.
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The distress associated with environmental
impacts, from displacement to losing one’s
home, has been studied a bit further:
solastalgia means specifically the distress
resulting from environmental change.4 It
includes aspects like the loss of familiar
environment as natural disasters destroy
homes and people are forced to abandon
their homes due to unlivable conditions. At
the core of solastalgia is an undercurrent of
powerlessness and lack of control frequently
present in contemplation when considering
the future for our world under the threat of
climate change. This commonly results in
increased cases of depression, anxiety, and
even suicide.4 Another aspect to this
scenario is the question of empowerment to
affect some degree of change. Engaging
local communities in efforts to combat
climate change and respond to natural
disaster is one possibility in alleviating the
negative mental health impacts of those
changes.
Section Two: Building Resilience,
Protection, and Adaptation with a Special
Concern for Safeguarding Human Health

31

Understanding just how a changing
environment impacts human health is a
necessary first step if we are to combat the
causes of those changes. Drawing on these
understandings, we now may begin to
explore a few possible theories for solutions.
First, there are some outstanding
contradictions which must be reconciled.
For instance, between the growing demand
for food and the increasing threat to food
security and environmental limits to
production: it is crucial that we seek out
sustainable intensification practices, such as
drip-irrigation or genetically-modified
organisms (GMOs).4 Achieving adequate
global food production for an increasing
population will take advanced scientific
application. In China, for example, an

enhanced approach to soil-crop system
management has been adopted which draws
on knowledge of individual crop
ecophysiology and soil biogeochemistry to
maximize yields of rice, wheat, and maize,
improving overall efficiency.4 It is going to
take creative solutions such as aquaponics,
growing plants in a soil-free fashion; this
practice utilizes aquariums of fish to supply
plants with nutrients, which in return filter
the water and keep the fish healthy.2 To
combat overfishing we must examine
sustainable aquaculture options, where fish
can be bred and “harvested” for the sole
purpose of being supplied as a food source.
Human lifestyles will also need to change as
we socially internalize the dangerous health
effects that a changing environment can
have. This includes dramatically reducing
food waste, and altering our diets to one that
is lower-impact.4 We must harmonize our
health and environmental policies at all
levels, and resist the urge to
compartmentalize each of them into separate
issue areas.
Throughout this next section of the
article, we will examine some case studies
and further detailed examples of options we
have for transforming our lifestyles, our
policies, and our relationship with the
environment in a way that minimizes our
contributions to destruction of the natural
environment and, in turn, protects our
collective human health from the dangerous
effects of anthropogenic changes in our
environment.
Regulation
One of the more popular attempts to
combat climate change in the hope of
minimizing its effects is through legislative
regulation. Regulation can have positive
impacts, but is often accompanied by
dissension at the idea of government
infiltration into private business practices.
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Nonetheless, it has historically played a
significant role, and continues to do so today.
To highlight this, we can look at an example
of a proposed (but ultimately unsuccessful)
piece of U.S. legislation aimed at reigning in
pollutive practices and protecting the
American people from harmful effects of
climate change
The Super Pollutants Act of 2015 was
aimed at reducing short-lived climate
pollutants, including black carbon, methane,
and hydrofluorocarbons, all of which are
significant contributors to both climate
change and other more direct effects on
human health; in fact, the reduction of these
pollutants could result in an estimated
prevention of two million premature deaths,
according to the UN Environmental
Program.6 The Act sought to effectively
accomplish this mission through a variety of
integrated measures. It called on a
combination of federal agencies and global
partnerships from the Arctic Council, to
USAID, to the EPA, to the US Export and
Import Bank to initiate practices and
implement policies which were tailored to
each agency’s portfolio and touched on the
wide reaching roots of the pollution
problem.6 Through a multi-pronged
approach which ranged from
recommendations on conditional financing
of sustainable energy projects to prioritizing
international development projects which
included provisions for black carbon
mitigation, this bill had the potential to spur
action across the necessary spectrum of
factors which have a hand in contributing to
the super pollutant emissions.
Sustainable Cities

32

Cities are often extra-vulnerable to
environment related health effects. They
also play a complex role in relation to
climate change and pollution. On one hand,
they offer opportunities for travel methods

which are more eco-friendly than single
person cars; however, they also concentrate
significant amounts of pollutants into one
area and are warmer on average than
suburban or rural areas which exacerbates
heat-related events; both of the latter
scenarios often lead to many health
problems.4 Despite these complicated
realities, there is a high degree of potential
for cities to become beacons of sustainable
living. By incorporating green spaces into
city life, air pollution and carbon emissions
can be reduced and rising temperatures can
be regulated.4 Not only does this assist in
alleviating threats of heat or pollution
related health ailments, but it contributes to
improved mental health as well.4 Overall, as
population trends point to increasing
populations in urban areas, cities small and
large are going to be pressed to transform
into sustainability centers. Thankfully, we
have some existing models to build off of
for inspiration.
The city of Burlington, capital of the
state of Vermont, was the first U.S. city to
transform its energy intake to 100%
renewable energy.7 The city of 42,000 has
been pointed to as a sustainability success
story, mainly for its transition from a
logging port on Lake Champlain to an
international model for sustainable policy
and livelihood. The city generates its energy
from a combination of locally (and
sustainably) harvested wood, a hydroelectric
plant, a few wind turbines on a nearby hill,
and an array of solar panels at its small
airport.7 On top of this, they have not had to
raise energy prices in nearly eight years; a
feat accomplished in large part due to the
investment in state-of-the-art scrubber
technology which was implemented at the
Burlington Electric station, allowing the city
to earn the state’s highest energy credits by
selling their emission rights out of state.7
The city, though, offers a full picture of
what a sustainable urban area can look like:
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in addition to Burlington’s impressive
energy generation statistics, the city gets its
food from a non-profit owned plot of 300
acre reclaimed floodplain land. The nonprofit got its startup funds from the
municipal government as part of an effort to
support local entrepreneurship under the
mayorship of a certain contemporary name
in sustainability policy, Bernie Sanders, in
his earliest days of public service. The food
is now harvested and sold as part of a
member-owned cooperative market located
in the downtown.7
Although Burlington offers a glorious
example of sustainable living, other efforts
can easily fall short in ways that have
detrimental effects on the natural
environment. For example, a new
development in southwest Florida is aiming
to be the world’s first solar-powered town.8
Those designing the town traveled across the
globe in search of the best practices to shape
their vision of what a futuristic municipality
should look like in a world increasingly
affected by climate change. Despite their
successes in designing an impressive solar
grid, integrated green space, and a locally
sourced food system, the simple overlook of
their local ecosystem could throw an ugly
stain on the acclaimed development. The
city’s location threatens to cut off transit of
one of the last remaining panther
populations in the state.8 While the
development itself poses no direct threats to
the critically endangered species according
to Fish and Wildlife Services, the proximity
can cause enough damage on its own. The
increased traffic, possibility of illegal
hunting, and pollution all factor into the
well-being of the panther population. The
development is also in a possible projected
area of expansion for the panther
population.8 This example demonstrates the
crucial necessity of careful, integrated
planning methods when designing
sustainable cities; and the importance of a

comprehensive solution where all aspects of
the issue are solved in the most appropriate
and efficient of manners.
Integrated Landscape Management
Solutions which include integrated
land use techniques oftentimes can be
optimal platforms for implementing policies
and practices which will interrupt the causes
of climate change and mediate its effects.
Integrated landscape management (ILM) is
more of a philosophy to approaching this
broader issue than a specific policy platform.
The idea behind it is to achieve multiple
targets in sustainability in the most efficient,
eco-friendly, and human-friendly way.
Through the harmonization of planning,
implementation, and monitoring, integrated
landscape management offers an alternative
to the siloed approach which plagues many
of our national and international efforts in
the fields of health, development, and
sustainability. In an oversimplified word, it
is all about “synergy.”9 For example, it can
look as simple as accomplishing the
reduction of cases of Lyme’s disease by
reducing transmitter agents through
protecting habitats by residential zones.4 In
protecting these ecosystems, we also prevent
biodiversity loss and maintain a critical
carbon sink, all while keeping to the original
goal of reducing cases of Lyme’s disease.
This is a prime example of how the health
and environmental field of policy can and
should be integrated, in order to maximize
effectiveness of proposed solutions.
A particularly useful framework for
illustrating this integration of the two fields
can be found in the United Nations’
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),
which were adopted in 2015 as part of the
2030 Agenda.10 These seventeen goals are
broken down further into 169 specific
targets. The philosophy behind these goals
and targets was to design them in such a
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way so as to implicitly promote
collaboration and integration of solutions.
For instance, the Lyme’s disease example
given above can easily be considered to
incorporate aspects of Goal 3, “Good Health
and Well-Being,” Goal 13, “Climate Action,”
and Goal 17, “Life on Land.”10 The very
design of these types of projects gives hope
and vision for what future approaches to a
wide variety of global challenges can look
like. ILM empowers local communities,
promotes transboundary cooperation
between industries, and reduces costs by
making solutions efficient.9
To provide a real-world case study
example, we will look to the Imarisha
Naivasha Board in the Lake Naivasha Basin
of Kenya. This Basin includes national parks,
bird sanctuaries, is home to over 700,000
people, and is the epicenter of the country’s
lucrative flower export industry.9 However,
due to poor agricultural practices, over
extraction of water, and uncoordinated
resource management, the local environment
became heavily strained. Not only were the
natural ecosystems in the region under
duress, but the floriculture, agriculture, and
ecotourism industries were also placed in a
direct line of threat by the environmental
damage.9 The solution to this environmental
crisis incorporated the philosophy of
integrated landscape management to gather
the multiple stakeholders together and
organize a unified plan to save the region’s
natural environment. In establishing the
Imarisha Naivasha Board, a combination of
local government, NGOs, small-scale
farmers, community groups, commercial
flower growers, and others developed the
“Lake Naivasha Integrated Management
Plan” to properly address the variety of
threats to their environment, local economy,
and ways of life.9
When the UN first came out with its
seventeen new SDGs, many were frustrated
at the evident vague language and ambitious

breadth of the targets. Critics pointed to the
SDGs as being too aloof, lacking in the
tangible community-level actionables which
would ultimately need to come about if
these grandiose Goals were to be anything
close to accomplished. What ILM offers is
landscape-scale solutions to a global
agenda.9 Although the Goals can be applied
to varying degrees of unique issues facing
communities in all corners of the globe, ILM
dissects these Goals into meaningful actions
to be undertaken at the most grassroots level
all across the globe.
Conclusion
The changing environment we are
experiencing today poses an unprecedented
breadth of threats to our livelihoods, most
poignantly to our human health. While
causality between environmental causes and
health effects is often difficult to prove
because of lack of information and the fact
that this is very much a new phenomenon,
with conditions changing every day and
throughout seasons, there is a substantial
degree of studies which show wide-ranging
areas of correlation which has meant
travesty for the health of whole populations
in every corner of the globe. We as
inhabitants of this unique planet have failed
to conscientiously self-regulate our waste,
our emissions, and our destruction on the
natural environment. For too many in our
societies today, the insight into the crisis
nature of this issue is dulled, or intentionally
overlooked in favor of profit, the status quo,
or fear of what acknowledging this
intimidating reality means.
Ignoring the realities of climate change
today must be understood to equate to
risking hundreds of thousands of lives which
have been shown to be at the mercy of a
changing environment and its harmful
effects. Anything less than this dims the
brutality of the crisis and lulls us into apathy
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and inaction. It is dangerous, deadly, and
unacceptable. Our response, therefore, must
be bold and it must be comprehensive. As I
have demonstrated above, when solutions
are designed in an integrated fashion,
incorporating a variety of stakeholders, and
not overlooking any component of the
broader environmental situation, we have
seen success and hope for a sustainable
future. It is through initiatives under this
philosophy, and only in this resolute and
meticulously premeditated fashion can we
hope to alleviate the health burden of our
human-induced environmental change.

Integrated Landscape Management.
Publication. The Landscapes for People,
Food and Nature Initiative.
Neuhauser, Alan. "A New Focus on Health."
U.S. News & World Report. May 6, 2016.
Accessed January 24, 2017.
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/201605-06/gina-mccarthy-climate-change-is-apublic-health-issue.
Preventing Disease Through Healthy
Environments. Report. Accessed January 24,
2017.
http://www.who.int/quantifying_ehimpacts/
publications/preventingdisease.pdf.

Bibliography
Boesch, Donald F. "Pfiesteria and the
Chesapeake Bay | BioScience | Oxford
Academic." OUP Academic. October 01,
2001. Accessed June 25, 2017.
https://academic.oup.com/bioscience/article/
51/10/803/245202/Pfiesteria-and-theChesapeake-Bay.
Brodish, P. H., and K. Singh. "Association
Between Schistosoma haematobium
Exposure and Human Immunodeficiency
Virus Infection Among Females in
Mozambique." The American journal of
tropical medicine and hygiene. May 04,
2016. Accessed June 4, 2017.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/2697
6893.
Helmore, Edward. "The solar-powered town:
a dream for the environment – or a wildlife
nightmare?" The Guardian. December 25,
2016. Accessed January 25, 2017.
https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/dec/25/solar-powered-townbabcock-ranch-environmentalist-panther.

35

Landscape Partnerships for Sustainable
Development: Achieving the SDGs Through

Purdy, Jedediah. "Environmentalism Was
Once a Social-Justice Movement." The
Atlantic. December 07, 2016. Accessed June
12, 2017.
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive
/2016/12/how-the-environmentalmovement-can-recover-its-soul/509831/.
Rhode, Robert A., and Richard A. Muller.
"Air Pollution in China: Mapping of
Concentrations and Sources." Plos One 10,
no. 8 (2015).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0135749.
"SDGs: Sustainable Development
Knowledge Platform." United Nations.
Accessed January 25, 2017.
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs.
Shah, Sonia. "Climate’s Strong Fingerprint
In Global Cholera Outbreaks." Yale E360.
February 17, 2011. Accessed July 31, 2017.
http://e360.yale.edu/features/climates_strong
_fingerprint__in_global_cholera_outbreaks.
Smith, K.R., A. Woodward, D. CampbellLendrum, D.D. Chadee, Y. Honda, Q. Liu,
J.M. Olwoch, B. Revich, and R. Sauerborn,
2014: Human health: impacts, adaptation,

Fairfield University | Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship | Spring 2018

Published by DigitalCommons@Fairfield, 2018

35

Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship, Vol. 2, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 6

and co-benefits. In: Climate Change 2014:
Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part
A: Global and Sectoral Aspects.
Contribution of Working Group II to the
Fifth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change [Field, C.B., V.R. Barros, D.J.
Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E.
Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada,
R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N.
Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea,
and L.L. White (eds.)]. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, United
Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, pp.
709-754.

Anthropocene epoch: report of The
Rockefeller Foundation–Lancet Commission
on planetary health." The Lancet 386, no.
10007 (2015): 1973-2028.
doi:10.1016/s0140-6736(15)60901-1.
Woodard, Colin, Erick Trickey, Karl Sharro,
Garrett M. Graff, and Maria Konnikova.
"America’s First All-Renewable-Energy
City." Politico.com. November 17, 2016.
Accessed January 25, 2017.
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/201
6/11/burlington-what-works-green-energy214463?cmpid=sf.

Super Pollutants Act of 2015, S. S. 2076,
114th Cong. (2015).
Whitmee, Sarah, Andy Haines, Chris Beyrer,
Frederick Boltz, Anthony G. Capon, Braulio
Ferreira De Souza Dias, Alex Ezeh, Howard
Frumkin, Peng Gong, Peter Head, Richard
Horton, Georgina M. Mace, Robert Marten,
Samuel S. Myers, Sania Nishtar, Steven A.
Osofsky, Subhrendu K. Pattanayak, Montira
J. Pongsiri, Cristina Romanelli, Agnes
Soucat, Jeanette Vega, and Derek Yach.
"Safeguarding human health in the

36

Fairfield University | Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship | Spring 2018

https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/jogc/vol2/iss3/6

36

et al.: Environmental Future(s) Initiative

THE IMPACT
(OR LACK
THEREOF) OF
RECENT
ENVIRNMENTAL
NEGOTIATIONS
ON CLIMATE
INDUCED
DISPLACEMENT
AARON SILBERMAN
Abstract
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As the effects of climate change on the
human condition become increasingly
apparent, a growing body of literature has
been authored concerning climate induced
displacement. While desertification, sea
level rise, extreme weather events, and other
climatic factors have increased the number
of climate displaced persons (CDPs),
political and legal frameworks have been
slow to respond to the burgeoning crisis.
Despite its unprecedented nature and
significant accomplishments, the 2015 Paris
Agreement includes little mention of
displacement, migration, or refugees; the
same is true of the resolutions adopted at the
second session of the United Nations
Environment Assembly and the 22nd
Conference of the Parties. This paper offers
an analysis of the COP21, UNEA II, and
COP22 environmental negotiations and
specifically focuses on how the language of
the aforementioned gatherings have, or have
not, affected the nexus of climate change
and displacement. This evaluation yields the
following: that COP21, UNEA II, and

COP22 have not yet had significant impact
on the status of current and potential CDPs,
and that vulnerable communities require
additional legal and political frameworks to
ensure dignified migration.
Introduction

On October 17th, 2016, Anote Tong, the
former President of the Republic of Kiribati
(“Kiribati”), delivered a set of remarks at
Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.
During his speech, President Tong focused
on climate induced displacement, one of the
manifestations of climate change that is
increasingly under the international
microscope:
Weather and climate are without a doubt
the most popular ice-breakers between
unfamiliar people trying to establish
some kind of a connection. And today,
climate change has also become the
hottest topic of discussion in the
international arena. But what do climate
change and recent international
negotiations on this issue mean for
countries in different parts of the world,
especially for those most vulnerable, like
Kiribati? The brutal reality is that, for
those of us living on low-lying atoll
islands, our future survival as a people
and a culture is very much in question.
The scenarios projected by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) indicate that, even if the
pledges on emissions made in Paris are
fully delivered, my homeland will still
be underwater well within the century.1

1
Tong, Anote. 2016. The global challenge of climateinduced migration. Georgetown University, Washington,
D.C.:
https://globalfutures.georgetown.edu/responses/the-globalchallenge-of-climate-induced-migration.
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President Tong’s remarks at Georgetown
University, much like the speeches he has
made throughout a lengthy career in public
service, were an attempt to analyze the
phenomenon of people being displaced from
their homes and/or countries by various
manifestations of climate change (e.g., rising
sea levels, desertification, extreme weather
patterns). This article seeks to provide
context for the urgency behind many of
President Tong’s claims and delve into the
impacts that recent, international
environmental negotiations have had on
climate induced displacement. Specifically,
this article will examine the results of the
following international environmental
negotiations: the 21st Conference of the
Parties to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (COP21);
the Second United Nations Environment
Assembly (UNEA II); and the 22nd
Conference of the Parties to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (COP22). In order to properly
evaluate the aforementioned Conferences
and Assembly, this article will provide an
overview of the history of international
environmental negotiations as well as a
review of legal code and political
convention insofar as they pertain to climate
induced displacement
The issue of climate induced
displacement is increasingly germane at
such negotiations given recent studies that
have been published and contain estimates
of the number of people who may be
potentially forced from their homes by
climate change. According to one such study
conducted by the International Organization
for Migration, between 50 million and 350
million people could be displaced by climate
change by 2050.2 The scope of this issue
extends throughout the world: communities
2

38

Laczko, Frank, and Christine Aghazarm. 2009. Migration,
environment and climate change: Assessing the evidence.
Switzerland: International Organization for Migration.

that can legitimately lay claim to being
displaced by climate change range exist in
Kiribati,3 the People’s Republic of
Bangladesh,4 the State of Alaska,5 and many
more countries.
It is worth briefly noting that,
throughout this article, those who are or will
be displaced by climate change will be
referred to as climate displaced persons
(“CDPs”). This terminology captures both
those who are displaced by climate change
and remain within their country of origin
and those who are forced to cross national
borders. This article is not unique in
utilizing such terminology, as is
demonstrated by the work of Rosemary
Lyster and others.6 However, by making use
of the term CDPs, this article seeks to avoid
entering into any discussion regarding the
merits of such phrases as “climate refugees”
or “climate migrants.” While some, such as
François Gemenne, argue that it is vital for
CDPs to referred to as “climate refugees” in
order to acknowledge the fact that many
displaced persons will come from
developing countries that have historically
contributed fewer greenhouse gas emissions
(“GHG emissions”) than developed
countries,7 the Nansen Conference on
3
Farbotko, Carol. 2010. Wishful sinking: Disappearing
islands, climate refugees and cosmopolitan experimentation.
Asia Pacific Viewpoint (51): 47.
4
Chaturvedi, Sanjay. 2010. Geopolitics of fear and the
emergence of ‘climate refugees’: Imaginative geographies
of climate change and displacements in Bangladesh.
Journal of the Indian Ocean Region 6 (2): 206.
5
Marino, Elizabeth. 2012. The long history of
environmental migration: Assessing vulnerability
construction and obstacles to successful relocation in
shishmaref, alaska. Global Environmental Change 22 (2):
374.
6
Lyster, Rosemary. 2015. Protecting the human rights of
climate displaced persons: The promise and limits of the
united nations framework convention on climate change. In
Research handbook on human rights and the environment.,
eds. A. Grear, L. Kotze. UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
7
Haley-Benjamin, Vanessa, Carl Bruch, François Gemenne,
Michael B. Gerrard, W. Chris King, and Benjamin
Schachter. 2016. The debate: Can the world community
handle environmental refugees? The Environmental Forum
Nov./December 2016 : 52.
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Climate Change and Displacement in the
21st Century acknowledged that no
terminology referring to persons displaced
by climate change has yet been universally
acknowledged or adopted.8 Given this
ambiguity vis-à-vis the propriety and
commonness of certain terms, this article
will attempt to steer clear of vocabularic
debate as best as is possible by exclusively
utilizing the CDP designation.
Relevant History
A Review of the History of the COP
The COP, which occurs on an annual
basis and rotates between different party
nations within the Conference, is the
decision making body of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change
(“UNFCCC”). According to the website of
the UNFCCC, “All States that are Parties to
the Convention are represented at the COP,
at which they review the implementation of
the Convention and any other legal
instruments that the COP adopts and take
decisions necessary to promote the effective
implementation of the Convention,
including institutional and administrative
arrangements.”9 The COP works to develop
policies that further the mission of the
UNFCCC, per Article 2 of the Convention,
to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions in
order to avoid harmful, anthropogenic
effects within the climate system.10 Since it
began in 1995, the COP has met 22 times,

with the most recent edition having been
held in Marrakech, Morocco. Different
committees have been created over the
history of the COP (e.g., an Adaptation
Committee), and leadership of the COP is
coordinated by the Secretariat of the
UNFCCC and a rotating chair of the COP
that is selected from the membership of the
Conference.11 As Ramakrishna described in
the late 1990s, one of the main functions of
the UNFCCC is to coalesce and support
efforts to aid developing countries that have
contributed fewer GHG emissions to climate
change than developed countries; have
access to fewer resources than developed
countries; and are often geographically
disadvantaged insofar as they are more
likely to suffer the consequences of climate
change earlier than developed countries.12
A Review of the History of the UNEA
The UNEA first occurred in June 2014
in Nairobi, Kenya, the headquarters of the
United Nations Environment Programme
(“UNEP”).13 The UNEA is part-governing
council, part-forum: it is attended by all
United Nations member states (either by
governmental representatives and/or
members of respective countries’ civil
societies) and assists in the contemplation
and drafting of policy pertaining to the
global environment. The UNEA was
mandated into existence at the 2012 Rio+20
United Nations Conference on Sustainable
Development in order to augment the
11

8

Hantscher, Sinja. 2016. The united nations high
commissioner for refugees' discourse on environmentally
displaced persons: A double-edged sword? In
Organizational perspectives on environmental migration.,
eds. Kerstin Rosenow-Williams, François Gemenne. 1st ed.,
93. New York: Routledge.
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Conference of the parties (COP). 2014. Accessed: 2017.
Available from http://unfccc.int/bodies/body/6383.php.
10
Egenhofer, Christian, ed. 2008. Beyond Bali: Strategic
issues for the post-2012 climate change regime. Brussels:
Centre for European Policy Studies.

Consolidated historical membership charts. 2016.
Accessed: 2017. Available from
http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/election_and_membership/app
lication/pdf/consolidated_historical_membership_charts.pd
f.
12
Kilaparti, Ramakrishna. 2000. The UNFCCC - history
and evolution of the climate change negotiations. In
Climate change and development., ed. L. Gómez Echeverri,
47. New Haven: Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies.
13
First united nations environment assembly. 2014.
Accessed: 2017. Available from
http://www.unep.org/unea1/en/.
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operational efficiency of the UNEP and its
Governing Council, which had been meeting
regularly since 1973.1415 The first UNEA
had a thematic focus on the Sustainable
Development Goals (“SDGs”), whereas
UNEA II’s main theme was “Delivering on
the Environmental Dimension of the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development.”16
According to official UNEA documentation
and the website of the UNEA, 17 resolutions
were adopted at the first UNEA,17 and 25
resolutions were adopted at UNEA II.18
Relevant History and Context of Climate
Induced Displacement
For much of the 20th and 20st
centuries, the predominant term used in
debates regarding climate induced
displacement was “environmental refugees.”
The earliest deployment of that term is most
correctly credited to Lester Brown, the
founder of the World Watch Institute, in
writings published in the early 1970s.19
However, “environmental refugees” did not
enter into common parlance until the mid-tolate 1980s with a UNEP report written by
Essam El-Hinnawi.20 As James Morrissey,

40

14
Sahba, Naysán. 2014. OurPlanet. Nairobi, Kenya: United
Nations Environment Programme.
15
United Nations Environment Programme. 1973. Paper
presented at Report of the Governing Council on the work
of its first session, New York.
16
United Nations Environment Programme. About UNEA.
2016. Accessed: 2017. Available from
http://web.unep.org/unea/about-unea.
17
United Nations Environment Programme. 2014.
Resolutions and decisions adopted by the united nations
environment assembly of the united nations environment
programme at its first session on 27 june 2014. Nairobi,
Kenya.
18
United Nations Environment Programme. List of
resolutions adopted at UNEA-2. 2016. Accessed: 2017.
Available from http://web.unep.org/unea/list-resolutionsadopted-unea-2.
19
Saunders, P. 2000. Environmental refugees: The origins
of a construct. In Political ecology: Science, myth and
power., 218. London: Oxford University Press.
20
Morrissey, James. 2012. Rethinking the 'debate on
environmental refugees': From 'maximalists and

in one of the definitive accounts of climate
induced displacement’s history, puts it:
[El-Hinnawi’s paper’s] effectiveness in
raising the profile of the 'environmental
refugee' was that El-Hinnawi provided
the first formal definition of the term
[“environmental refugee”]. This was
important for operationalizing it, which
in turn allowed for a blossoming of
work that focused on both documenting
the existence of migration forced by
environmental crises, and on
formulating numerical projections of
future 'environmental refugees'.21
Following the 1985 UNEP report, the pace
of research being conducted on climate
induced displacement and the potential
number of CDPs increased throughout the
1990s and early 2000s. One of the most
influential authors of this era, Norman
Myers, was particularly known for his
claims that enormous numbers of CDPs did
exist and would grow at an exponential rate
in the early to mid-2000s: in one of his most
recent publically-available works, Myers
asserts that “As far back as 1995 …
environmental refugees totaled at least 25
million people,” and that as many as 200
million CDPs could exist in an unspecified
near future.22 While Myers’ work is laudable,
insofar as it has likely increased the amount
of attention that policy and lawmakers have
paid to climate induced displacement, his
estimates are often outliers relative to other
studies, and his predictions have been

minimalists' to 'proponents and critics'. Journal of Political
Ecology 19 : 36.
21
Ibid.
22
Myers, Norman. 2005. Contribution by prof. norman
myers, green college, oxford university, U.K.,
"environmental refugees: An emergent security issue".
Paper presented at 13th Economic Forum, Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) , Prague,
Czech Republic.
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publicly questioned by peers and media
outlets.23
Though there is consensus among
experts working in both climate change and
migration studies that the number of
displaced persons will be substantial,
estimates range from 50 million to 1 billion
in the coming decades.24 Given such a wide
range, this article will seek to avoid
predicating itself on more specific estimates
that may prove to be inordinately inaccurate
in the near future. An example of a guiding
document for this article would be a recent
discussion paper published by the Office of
Conflict Management and Mitigation that
acknowledges the likelihood of some tens of
millions of CDPs while also opening the
door for a larger number that can be clarified
at a later date.25
Policymakers, military leaders, and
legal experts have been interpreting and
responding to the work of climate induced
displacement researchers for close to three
decades. Often, it is common for
policymakers in both national (e.g., the U.S.
Army) and international organizations (e.g.,
the United Nations) to frame climate
induced displacement in security terms and
depict CDPs at potentially destabilizing
factors. As Nash deftly examines, even the
United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (“UNHCR”), the arm of the UN
that is most centered around quantifying and
supporting refugees and migrants, has
demonstrated a predilection for ‘securitizing’

CDPs.26 Securitizing rhetoric, or
‘problematizing rhetoric,’ is best understood
as being any language that is applied to an
issue or group of people (in this case,
climate induced displacement and CDPs)
and typically classifies said issue or group as
being likely threats and/or threataugmenting factors. The reason that such
language might be employed is to shock
governmental officials, large financial
donors, or others into taking action on an
issue that might otherwise be perceived as
being relatively slow moving.27 Additional
examples of the securitization of CDPs
abound and include, but are not limited to, a
2015 Department of Defense Report that
evoked and focused on the likelihood that,
unchecked, climate induced displacement
would augment pre-existing security threats
and exacerbate the development of new
security threats.28
Before effectively analyzing the
impacts of COP21, UNEA II, and COP22,
one must briefly examine the United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (“1951 Refugees Convention”).
The 1951 Refugees Convention is the
fundamental, international legal
underpinning of what countries should do,
individually and collectively, in response to
refugees. Ratified by 145 nations, the 1951
Refugees Convention provides for a
definition of refugees, describes the
obligations of states to care for said refugees,
and attempts to quell any potential
discontent with said obligations that could
emerge and weaken the ties that bind states

23
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Barnes, Hannah. 2013. How many climate migrants will
there be? BBC, 3 September 2013. Accessed 2016.
24
Ferris, Elizabeth. 2015. Climate change, migration and
the incredibly complicated task of influencing policy:
Conference on ‘Human Migration and the Environment:
Futures, Politics, Invention.” Durham University, Durham,
UK
25
Null, Schuyler, and Lauren Herzer Risi. 2016.
Navigating complexity: Climate, migration, and Conflict in
a changing world. Washington, D.C.: Office of Conflict
Management and Mitigation; United States Agency for
International Development; Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars.
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Nash, Sarah. 2016. Towards an ‘environmental migration
management’ discourse: a discursive turn in environmental
migration advocacy? In Organizational Perspectives on
Environmental Migration., eds. Kerstin Rosenow-Williams,
François Gemenne. 1st ed., 198. New York: Routledge.
27
Ibid.
28
Department of Defense. 2015. National security
implications of climate-related risks and a changing
climate. Department of Defense, 8-6475571.
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to each other and their duties.29 For the
purposes of this article, it is worth carefully
highlighting the Convention’s parameters
for who may, and may not, constitute a
refugee:
[The term “refugee” shall apply to
those who,] owing to well founded fear
of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself
of the protection of that country; or
who, not having a nationality and
being outside the country of his former
habitual residence as a result of such
events, is unable or, owing to such fear,
is unwilling to return to it.30
This foundational, internationally-agreed
upon document does not include reference to
environmental or climatic factors that might
justify benefits being allotted to those who
are displaced by phenomena unrelated to
race, religion, nationality, and other such
factors. Therefore, the majority of CDPs,
unless other factors complicate their
displacement, do not currently receive any
international protection via the 1951
Refugee Convention. This fact has bedeviled
advocates and the lawyers of CDPs for years,
and all recent international environmental
negotiations that have attempted to contend
with the issue of climate induced
displacement have been forced to address, in
one way or another, the limitations imposed
by the 1951 Refugees Convention.
Effects of the Paris Agreement and postParis Negotiations
29

42

Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, (2010): Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10.
30
Ibid.

Given that the COP21, UNEA II, and
COP22 negotiations have all occurred in the
recent past, as well as the fact that it is
difficult to accurately extrapolate the
longitudinal impacts that said negotiations
will have on climate induced displacement
politics and law, this article exclusively
analyzes the three negotiations based on the
formal and informal language that they
adopted vis-à-vis CDPs. Whereas the typical
COP and UNEA produce numerous
resolutions that pertain to various, disparate
subjects, COP21 was unique because of its
almost singular focus on an allencompassing goal: the finalization of the
so-called Paris Agreement. Therefore, with
the Paris Agreement dominating the results
of COP21 to a near-exclusive degree,
analysis of the impacts of COP21 on climate
induced displacement necessarily focuses on
the Agreement.
Given this, a simplistic search
mechanism was applied to the Paris
Agreement in order to ascertain whether it
addressed climate induced displacement
and/or CDPs. For searches of the Paris
Agreement, as well as other documentation
produced during COP21, UNEA II, and
COP22, pertinent synonyms for the term
“displacement” were searched for in order to
ensure that no mention of the subject would
go overlooked. Such terms included
“refugee(s),” “migrant(s),” “migration,”
“movement,” “resettle,” and other, similar
variations. Applying these search parameters
to the Paris Agreement yielded only one
result, found in the Preamble (emphasis
added):
Acknowledging that climate change is
a common concern of humankind,
Parties should, when taking action to
address climate change, respect,
promote and consider their respective
obligations on human rights, the right
to health, the rights of indigenous
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peoples, local communities, migrants,
children, persons with disabilities and
people in vulnerable situations and the
right to development, as well as gender
equality, empowerment of women and
intergenerational equity…31
This allusion to climate induced
displacement in the Paris Agreement was
significant for several reasons. The first was
the historic nature of the Agreement itself:
following on the years of civil society calls
for an overarching, international treaty on
climate change, the final text of the Paris
Agreement was greeted in some corners
with joy and others with something closer to
despair.32 As Jacquet and Jamieson describe
it, the Paris Agreement, by virtue of its
largely-voluntary and non-binding set of
principles, relies on civil society more than
previous international agreements for its
own effective implementation.33 Given this,
the Agreement’s official acknowledgement
of climate induced displacement, and more
specifically the rights that CDPs should be
accorded, functions as a clarion call for
advocates and policymakers to push their
national governments in order to proactively
address the thorny issue.
The second, more disquieting reason is
the fact that the language included in the
final documentation was altered from earlier
draft language that was much more forceful.
As Savaresi notes, a climate induced
displacement “coordination facility” was
acknowledged in early drafts of the
Agreement: by the time COP21 concluded,
that concrete language had been erased in
favor of a more nebulous affirmation of the

31

United Nations. Paris Agreement (12/12/2015).
Jacquet, Jennifer, and Dale Jamieson. 2016. Soft but
significant power in the paris agreement. Nature Climate
Change 6 : 643.
33
Ibid.
32

43

existence and rights of CDPs.34 However, in
an accompanying document that was agreed
upon in order to facilitate the adoption of the
Paris Agreement, more specificity was given
to the climate induced displacement issue. In
the document, the COP calls for the
development of a task force that would be
entrusted with the creation of
recommendations for how the international
community can best “avert, minimize and
address” climate induced displacement.35
Inasmuch as a relatively short amount of
time has passed since the conclusion of
COP21, it is difficult to objectively and
conclusively determine which of the two
aforementioned documents has had a more
significant impact on the state of affairs
regarding climate induced displacement.
However, given the more concrete nature of
the Adoption of the Paris Agreement versus
the Paris Agreement itself, the former has,
and will likely have, a greater effect on
CDPs and their affairs. With that being said,
it is clear that COP21 was focused on
international and national emissions targets
to the extent that it was unable to devote a
significant portion of time to climate
induced displacement, thus handicapping its
ability to include impactful reference to
CDPs in its final texts.36
Following the December, 2015
conclusion of COP21 in Paris, France,
UNEA II occurred in Nairobi, Kenya, in
May 2016. According to the official website
of the UNEA, a total of 25 resolutions were
formally adopted by the Assembly’s end.37
34
Savaresi, Annalisa. 2016. The paris agreement: A new
beginning? Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 34
(1):16.
35
Adoption of the Paris Agreement, (2015): ,
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09.pdf.
36
Warren, Phillip. 2016. Evaluating the 'climate change
displacement coordination facility': How the UNFCCC can
address forced migration after paris COP21. Columbia Law
Review Forthcoming.
37
List of resolutions adopted at UNEA-2. 2016. Accessed:
2017. Available from http://web.unep.org/unea/listresolutions-adopted-unea-2.
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In order to ensure the analysis of these
resolutions was uniform with the review
conducted on COP21’s documents, the same
search terms and parameters were utilized in
both cases.
Upon application of the
aforementioned search parameters to the
official resolutions adopted at UNEA II, it
was found that only two contained any
language that pertained to climate induced
displacement. The first resolution,
Protection of the Environment in Areas
Affected by Armed Conflict (“2/15”),
predominantly focused on the intersection
between environmental degradation and
armed conflict; specifically, the resolution
sought to reaffirm pre-existing initiatives
that pertained to environmental
peacebuilding and support the development
of new endeavors that might be able to
address needs that are not presently being
met by the international community.38 2/15
acknowledged the causal links between
environmental degradation (e.g., as might be
caused by armed conflict) and displacement;
additionally, 2/15 recommended that the
Executive Director of the UNEP provide
additional assistance to those countries that
may be affected by armed conflict,
displacement, and environmental
degradation.39 However, neither 2/15’s
acknowledgement nor its recommendation
explicitly addressed climate induced
displacement outside of the lenses of
environmental degradation and
environmental peacebuilding.
The other UNEA II resolution that
referred to climate induced displacement,
Combating Desertification, Land
Degradation and Drought and Promoting
Sustainable Pastoralism and Rangelands
38

44

United Nations Environment Programme. 2/15.
Protection of the Environment in Areas Affected by Armed
Conflict(5/23-27/2016, 2016).
39
Ibid.

(“2/24”), included language that posited that
sustainable, proactive land management
practices could help ameliorate the
likelihood of displacement occurring; with
that being said, 2/24, much like 2/15, did not
explicate or investigate the plight of CDPs
in its own terms; rather, it did so in the
contexts of desertification and land
degradation.40 Beyond 2/15 and 2/24, no
other official UNEP or UN documentation
that originated during UNEA II could be
found that related to climate induced
displacement.
The final, recent international
environmental negotiation that this article
evaluates is COP22, which concluded in
December 2016 in Marrakech, Morocco.
Perhaps the most well-known document to
have been generated at COP22 is the
Marrakech Action Proclamation For Our
Climate And Sustainable Development
(“Marrakech Proclamation”), which
organizations and media outlets in some
corners interpreted as a rebuttal to the thenPresident Elect Donald Trump’s having cast
aspersions on the science and policy
endeavors of the UN.414243 However, in
applying the same search parameters that
were applied to COP21 and UNEA II to the
Marrakech Proclamation, it is revealed that
the document contains no mention of
migration, displacement, refugees, the
movement of people, or CDPs.44 Though the
40

United Nations Environment Programme. 2/24.
Combating Desertification, Land Degradation and Drought
and Promoting Sustainable Pastoralism and
Rangelands(05/23-27/2016, 2016).
41
King, Ed. 2016. Marrakech call decoded: UN sends
drumpf its climate demands. Climate Home, 15/11/2016,
2016.
42
Editorial. 2016. Marrakech: Climate conference in grim
political weather. Katoikos.eu, 11/22/2016, 2016.
43
Venkat, Vidya. 2016. Marrakech action proclamation
sends out a strong signal on climate. The Hindu,
18/11/2016, 2016.
44
Marrakech Action Proclamation for our Climate and
Sustainable Development (2016).
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/marrakech_nov_2016/appli
cation/pdf/marrakech_action_proclamation.pdf
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document is short and broad, it does mention
several facets of climate change and goals
with specificity (e.g., a goal of $100 billion
for developing countries’ mobilization and
sustainable development); given the fact that
the document was signed by all attendees at
COP22, it is fair to surmise that climate
induced displacement did not draw the same
level of consensus that renewable energy
deployment, sustainable development, and
other topics did.45
At COP22, 35 official ‘Decisions’
were adopted by the COP and two other,
related governing bodies.46 The
preponderance of these decisions, upon
review, does not contain language or
allusion to climate induced displacement
and/or CDPs. Only one Decision, entitled
Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss
and Damage associated with Climate
Change (“Warsaw International Mechanism
Decision”), pertained to climate induced
displacement; however, unlike the two
resolutions discussed above that were
adopted at UNEA II, the Warsaw
International Mechanism Decision’s
language regarding CDPs indicates both
precision and an apprehension of the
remarkable challenge that is climate induced
displacement.4748 That is to say, the Warsaw
45

Ibid.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change. Decisions adopted by COP 22 and CMP 12 and
CMA 1. 2017. Accessed: 2017. Available from
http://unfccc.int/2860.php#auv.
47
Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage
Associated with Climate Change, (2016): ,
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/marrakech_nov_2016/applic
ation/pdf/auv_cop22_i7_wim1.pdf.
48
In order to avoid confusion, it is worth clarifying that this
decision is named after an organization called the Warsaw
International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated
with Climate Change Impacts (“Loss and Damage
Mechanism”). The Loss and Damage Mechanism was
established at COP19 in Warsaw, Poland, and is dedicated
to investigating and promoting methodologies by which
loss and damage caused by climate change can be properly
accounted for by the international community. The Loss
and Damage Mechanism has, until this point, proved to be
one of the main channels that the UN and its member states
have utilized in order to officially appraise the nature of
46

45

International Mechanism Decision is a
Decision, adopted by all UN member states,
that clearly evinces the challenge that CDPs
face and seeks to provide specific research
and assistance into climate induced
displacement without such research and
assistance being interpreted through a
secondary (e.g., environmental
peacebuilding, sustainable development)
lense.
One additional, distinct but interrelated
document presented at COP22 is worth
noting: the Report of the Executive
Committee of the Warsaw International
Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated
with Climate Change Impacts (“Report of
the Executive Committee of the Warsaw
Mechanism”). The Executive Committee of
the aforementioned International
Mechanism presented this report to
UNFCCC member states during COP22’s
proceedings. In the Report, both migration
and climate induced displacement are
specifically mentioned over two dozen
times.49 The Report of the Executive
Committee of the Warsaw Mechanism is
predominantly a review of the work of the
Warsaw International Mechanism in the 12
months following COP21; therefore, it does
not contain much new information, research,
or pledges to action. However, there is one
exception to that rule:

climate induced displacement and other manifestations of
climate change that explicitly involve damages incurred on
both developed and developing countries. Reference:
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Warsaw international mechanism for loss and damage
associated with climate change impacts. 20162017].
Available from
http://unfccc.int/adaptation/workstreams/loss_and_damage/
items/8134.php.
49
Executive Committee of the Warsaw International
Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate
Change Impacts. 2016. Report of the executive committee
of the warsaw international mechanism for loss and
damage associated with climate change impacts. UNFCCC,
GE.16-17845(E).
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The task force [on climate induced
displacement underneath the Warsaw
International Mechanism] is to deliver
its recommendations [viz. climate
induced displacement] no later than at
COP 24 and it may assist the
Executive Committee in guiding the
implementation of the Warsaw
International Mechanism, in an
advisory role, specifically on activities
related to enhancing the understanding
of and expertise on how the impacts of
climate change are affecting patterns
of migration, displacement and human
mobility, and the application of such
understanding and expertise.50
The significance of this section of the
Report of the Executive Committee of the
Warsaw Mechanism is that it attaches a hard
deadline to international recommendations
regarding climate induced displacement.
Insofar as can be stated after review of the
body of work created during COP21, UNEA
II, and COP22, this Report breaks new
ground by establishing an end date for the
first phase of the process by which
recommendations on how to respond to
CDPs would be created and subsequently
implemented. It could be argued that the
most significant outcome of COP22 vis-àvis climate induced displacement was the
presentation of this Report and its
assurances that, by COP24,
recommendations for how nations should
respond to CDPs will be up for public
consideration. This presentation will likely
take place in the Polish city of Katowice,
where the Republic of Poland and the
UNFCCC announced COP24 will take place.
Efforts to bring COP24 to Poland were
spearheaded by Polish Environment
Minister Jan Szysko, who will likely help to
oversee the conference, and the presentation

46

50

on climate induced displacement, when it
occurs in 2018.51
Conclusion
In conclusion, this article’s objective
was to analyze the impacts that COP21,
UNEA II, and COP22 have had on the state
of global, climate induced displacement by
reviewing all official documentation
generated during those negotiations. Despite
numerous positive developments within the
official, UN-sponsored environmental
negotiations sphere (e.g., the Paris
Agreement’s acknowledgement of the rights
of CDPs, UNEA II’s two resolutions and
their allusions to climate induced
displacement, the COP22 announcement of
a deadline for international
recommendations on climate induced
displacement), it is fair to assert that an
insufficient amount of work has been
accomplished in these recent conferences
and assembly in order to bridge the gap
created by a lack of political and legal
protection for CDPs. The efforts of
participants of COP21, UNEA II, and
COP22 are likely to be viewed as important
by future historians who themselves will be
looking over the history of climate
displacement policy. However, by COP22’s
conclusion, CDPs were in approximately the
same standing as they were at the opening
gavel of COP21.
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ENGAGING
NARRATIVES:
ENVIRONMENTAL
ESSENTIALISM
AND
INTERSECTIONAL
JUSTICE
PROFESSOR RANDALL AMSTER
PROFESSOR YUKI KATO
Introduction

When we consider environmental
challenges, especially in a policy-oriented
context, there is an understandable
predisposition to be analytical and strategic
in the pursuit of viable political and
economic solutions. There is a basic
recognition at work in most quarters that the
mounting crises in our midst—from
toxification and degradation to resource
conflicts and climate destabilization—are
monumental in scope, and that they require
coordinated, multilayered efforts in order to
be remediated. Governmental
representatives, private sector entrepreneurs,
civil society organizations, and on-theground practitioners generally converge
around the core idea that environmental
issues are escalating, and a confluence of
political, economic, technological, and
informational mechanisms are required in
order to address them meaningfully. As such,
the scope of environmental engagement
largely resides in the technical and political
realm, yielding a policy-driven framework
defined mainly by diplomatic negotiations
and bilateral agreements.

50

Indeed, these are all potent
mechanisms for addressing such complex
problems, yet they only tell part of the story.
Beyond considerations of political economy,
governance, data, and technology, there are
the narratives, perspectives, and livelihoods
of multitudes of people around the world
who experience these issues and challenges
in direct and concrete ways. Exploring and
validating the interior and emotive domains
of coping with profound environmental
challenges—including motivations,
deprivations, reflections, accommodations,
and resistances—can inform the
policymaking sphere in critical ways. The
adaptation of these narratives could itself
reproduce, rather than challenge, the power
dynamics that underlie the causes of
environmental injustices if applied
uncritically. The native voices could be
coopted in ways that cast these people and
places as symbolically valorized others or
powerless victims that are in need of
protection by us. However, by recentering
these narratives, a critical stance is being
cultivated in helping to unpack the potential
pitfalls of an increasing tendency to
highlight personal stories as a means of
asserting greater technical control. In some
cases, these patterns go so far as to affirm
historical identity constructions that raise
fundamental issues of justice.1 This article
critically explores these issues, striving to
investigate the narrative terrains of
environmental engagement as a means of
cultivating more robust policies, in the belief
that durable solutions to profound crises
must address issues at the political and
personal levels alike.
In this work, we are guided by the
realization that the political and personal
spheres are inherently interconnected, and
1

Dickinson, Elizabeth. 2012. Addressing Environmental
Racism Through Storytelling: Toward an Environmental
Justice Narrative Framework. Communication, Culture &
Critique 5 (1): 57-74.
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are continually being shaped by each other;
it is precisely this dialectical relationship
that leads us to an inquiry into how
narratives reflect our understanding of both
realms. As such, narratives of empowerment
can be coopted by the larger political forces
that created conditions of exploitation in the
first place, necessitating a critical re-reading
of both the narratives and the power
dynamics involved in creating and
communicating them. In mapping this
terrain, we draw upon materials from policy
and academic spheres, as well as
publications from advocacy and
entrepreneurial sectors, with a specific focus
on how gender shapes or gets shaped in
these narratives. In particular, the
identification of “stakeholders” in
environmental governance forums at the
global scale often devolves upon a top-down
model in which decisions are taken by state
or corporate actors, leaving individuals and
communities in bystander (or even
demonstrator) role. The implications for
women in this dynamic are especially
problematic, since “a sensitive approach to
addressing gender-specific vulnerability and
resilience … is still lacking in policy on the
environment and conflict.”2
Here, we seek to encourage a more
participatory process by straightforwardly
bringing voices that are often excluded to
the fore, through a critical discourse analysis
of current policymaking and marketing
trends within environmental efforts. Critical
discourse analysis examines “social
inequality as it is expressed, constituted,
legitimized, and so on, by language use,”3
2

Reid, Alex. 2017. Understanding Gender, Conflict, and
the Environment. Toxic Remnants of War Project (June 5).
Accessed 2017. Available from
http://www.trwn.org/understanding-gender-conflict-andthe-environment/
3
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Weiss, Gilbert, and Ruth Wodak, eds. 2003, 15. Critical
Discourse Analysis: Theory and Interdisciplinarity. London,
UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

and explores how power and social
relationships manifest in written or spoken
language. Using this approach, we examine
terms such as “victims” or “heroes” not
simply as a description of someone’s
inherent status, but as an embodiment of
who has the power to ascribe status to
others. Our intention is to frame these issues
of power, representation, and legitimation
for further exploration, highlighting
examples of how personal narratives of
potential environmental empowerment can
be utilized by powerful actors for divergent
purposes, and how these forces mirror
patterns found vis-à-vis the role of women
in many developing regions of the world. In
order to do so, we draw upon examples of
texts and publications gleaned from the field,
and interrogate their linguistic choices and
the power dynamics within their
presentation. We conclude by connecting
these issues to larger struggles in the
environmental justice milieu.
Interior and Emotive Terrains of
Environmentalism
Environmental issues can be expressed
through technical, scientific, and data-driven
means, but they can also be thought of in
more humanistic and even emotional terms.
One can clinically analyze the loss of
biodiversity or the poisoning of waterways
in a manner that creates distance between
ourselves and the living things (including
people) impacted by these precipitous
transformations; such interventions resonate
impressively on Powerpoint slides and in
legislative drafting sessions, yet they omit
equally critical factors of compassion,
interconnection, empowerment, trauma, loss,
and more. In short, it might be said that the
analytical approach oftentimes prioritizes
the workings of the mind as against those of
the heart. This is perhaps understandable in
managing parliamentary-type proceedings,
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but there may be unintended consequences
including the further separation of humans
from the biotic systems of the planet.
This is a complex subject to broach,
because (among other things) it plays into
stereotypes of environmentalists as “tree
huggers” and threatens to cloud sober
judgment with sentimentalism. Public
displays of emotion can create an impression
of vulnerability and weaken one’s position
at the bargaining table. By keeping the
discussion at the analytical level—for
instance, in representing lost habitats,
species, or even human casualties as data
points on a graph, or by discussing human
rights issues such as refugeeism or negative
health consequences in purely quantitative
terms—one can perhaps enhance the impact
and strength of their argument while at the
same time losing an important part of its
texture. When the presentation of critical
issues remains at the strictly technical or
political level, it can serve to obscure the
actual people and ecosystems being
impacted. In this sense, the magnitude of
concern over environmental issues can at
times be displayed without showing as much
concern for those directly impacted.
It is this context that we are oftentimes
presented with information about people
being uprooted en masse by desertification
and climate disruption, about the imminent
submersion of island nations, about the
severe long-term health impacts of postconflict environmental contamination, or
even about the myriad frontline
environmental defenders who have paid
with their lives to confront patterns of
degradation and despoliation. Clinical
assessments and data-driven presentations
are important, yet there is a concomitant
need to hear from impacted communities
directly. Interestingly, some stakeholders
grasp this integrative dynamic, even as the
method used to address it may serve to
further exacerbate the problem. Thus,

numerous presentations and publications
(which we analyze in more detail below)
will include an invocation of someone’s
“story” (often a woman from the developing
world) as a means to highlight the efficacy
of their innovative technology or the utility
of their policy platform. Needless to say,
those whose stories are featured in this way
rarely, if ever, attend the forums to convey
these narratives themselves.
“The story of…” is thus a popular
entry point for highlighting an array of
technological innovations (e.g., solar lights;
clean stoves) and policy proposals (e.g.,
microfinance; mediation). The virtues of
flexibility, mobility, on-demand and sharing
economies, and sociopolitical empowerment
may be touted through these “stories” but
they are likely to be told about rather than
by those featured in them. In fact, some of
these innovations are premised on a pay-asyou-go business model that provides access
to them with little or no upfront costs—but
with the caveat that they can also be
removed promptly for nonpayment. The
empowerment of women (generally women
of color) may be invoked as a selling point,
as may be the benefits for students and, of
course, the overall greening of the
environment. However, if these technologies
are positioned to empower women, open up
educational opportunities for children, and
mitigate environmental harm, then turning
them off for nonpayment might be more
heartless than not providing them in the first
place. What is needed are effective solutions
that integrate minds and hearts equally, as
we move from centralized models to more
collaborative ones, and ultimately as human
beings attempting to cope with the urgent
responsibility of transforming our
environmental relations.
In this spirit, environmental discourse
at times does include the direct (and even
heartfelt) stories of people struggling to
mitigate and adapt to a rapidly changing
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world. Thus, the former president of Kiribati,
Anote Tong, poignantly describes the
imminent submersion of his island nation by
rising ocean levels without rancor or
recrimination, imploring people everywhere
to embrace a spirit of ethical engagement
and common humanity.4 Human rights
advocates communicate the compelling
stories of ordinary people who become
activists by necessity and work to transform
conditions in their communities as well as
our understanding of how change works—
sometimes paying with their lives for these
efforts, as with the case of Honduran activist
Berta Cáceres.5 Engaging these narratives in
a meaningful manner, without further
“otherizing” or exploiting their progenitors,
is a fundamental challenge for
environmental movements and policymakers.
A critical analysis of the role that gender in
particular plays in these processes can help
inform the wider discussion of these core
issues.
Gendered Lenses and Environmental
Essentialism
In the annals of environmentalism, the
role of gender is central yet often
underexplored. While there have been many
investigations of the differential impacts of
ecological challenges on women, as well as
the intersections of these patterns through
lenses such as ecofeminism,6 less considered
in the analysis is the nascent view of women
as “sustainability saviors” and the
4
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Tong, Anote. 2016. The Global Challenge of ClimateInduced Migration. Global Future(s) Initiative,
Georgetown University (November 11). Accessed 2017.
Available from
https://globalfutures.georgetown.edu/responses/the-globalchallenge-of-climate-induced-migration
5
Watts, Jonathan. 2016. Berta Cáceres, Honduran Human
Rights and Environment Activist, Murdered. The Guardian
(March 4). Accessed 2017. Available from
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/03/honduras
-berta-caceres-murder-enivronment-activist-human-rights
6
Mies, Maria, and Vandana Shiva, eds. 1993. Ecofeminism.
Zed Books.

implications of such constructions. In
essence, the argument is that due to their
close connection to the material bases of life
in many locales—including procuring food,
fuel, water, and other essentials—women
have a unique perspective and capacity to
address environmental challenges in
important ways. While this can be
empowering, it also potentially reifies
historical associations of gender and nature
that are problematic, as well as running up
against a core tenet of environmental
justice stating that people who contribute the
least to crises are often impacted the most by
them—and further that it should not then fall
upon them to be primarily responsible for
remediating those crises. We engage these
matters without resorting to either
victimization or valorization by cultivating
pathways toward collaborative ecological
engagement, emphasizing policy
frameworks and lived experiences equally in
seeking tenable and durable solutions.
In order to do so, we need to unpack
some of the strands that have brought us
here. From a historical perspective, there is
the sensibility expressed by Sir Francis
Bacon advocating the “torture of nature for
her secrets.” While this precise quote is
likely apocryphal, Carolyn Merchant
observes that its intent is wholly consistent
with the rationalist/scientific paradigm, for
which “the rack exemplified the constraint
of nature in a closed, controlled system,
responding to questions posed by an
inquisitor before witnesses—the very core
of experimentation itself.”7 This paradigm is
reflective of an impetus to correlate gender
and nature, which is operationalized, as
Greta Gaard contends, in “the ways that the
feminized status of women, animals, nature,
and feminized others … have been
conceived of as separate and inferior in
order to legitimate their subordination under
7
Merchant, Carolyn. 2006. The Scientific Revolution and
The Death of Nature. Isis 97 (3): 513.
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an elite and often violent and militarized
male-dominant social order.”8 Bringing this
analysis into contemporary issues, Gaard
offers this historical backdrop as a basis for
reconsidering the mounting challenges in
our midst: “The global crises of climate
justice, food security, energy justice,
vanishing wildlife, maldevelopment, habitat
loss, industrial animal food production, and
more have simultaneously social and
ecological dimensions that require both
ecological and feminist analyses.”9
Today, however, this lens often looks
more like depicting women as either victims
or saviors in the environmental policy
discourse. Thus it is stated that “women’s
knowledge, agency and collective action has
huge potential to improve resource
productivity, enhance ecosystem
conservation and sustainable use of natural
resources, and to create more sustainable,
low-carbon food, energy, water and health
systems. Failure to capitalize on this would
be a missed opportunity. Women should not
be viewed as victims, but as central actors in
moving towards sustainability.”10 As we
elaborate below, there are numerous ways in
which this discourse is framed and promoted,
with myriad examples that seek to cast
women—due to their “special” roles and
skills in many developing societies—as
nascent environmental heroines.
Constructions of empowerment are often
invoked, linking “the causes and underlying
drivers of unsustainability and gender
inequality,” advocating for giving women
“greater voice and participation” as a means
to generate more sustainable outcomes, and
setting a premium on “women’s knowledge,

54

8
Gaard, Greta. 2011. Ecofeminism Revisited: Rejecting
Essentialism and Re-Placing Species in a Material Feminist
Environmentalism. Feminist Formations 23 (2): 26.
9
Ibid.
10
UN Women. 2014, 7. World Survey on the Role of
Women in Development: Gender Equality and Sustainable
Development. New York: United Nations (report).

agency and action” as a tool of sustainability
(passages noted below).
While this isn’t inherently problematic,
the larger context of the discourse is
illustrative of the potential pitfalls and how
historical patterns of gender essentialism can
be replicated, even with ostensibly positive
intentions—as the following linked passages
illustrate (emphases added):
“This is a project intended to celebrate
the role of women in science,
technology, sailing. Not only does it
break down gender stereotypes, but it
also harnesses the power of them.”11
“Women are not merely passive
victims of climate change and
environmental degradation…. Women
are a driving force for the new, more
equitable and more sustainable model
of growth.”12 “[Women’s] knowledge,
innovation, action and agency is
central to finding, demonstrating and
building more economically, socially
and ecologically sustainable ways to
manage local ecologies, adapt to
climate change, produce and access
food and secure sustainable and
appropriate water, sanitation and
energy services.”13 “Energy prosperity
has a female face…. There is a strong
case for what women can do to expand
clean energy access and to fight on the
front lines against climate change.”14
Even within this same body of literature
there is a recognition of the potential
problems with these constructions, including
how they potentially reify historical patterns.
The self-reflective nature of these claims
11
UNEP. 2014, 36. Gender Heroes: From Grassroots to
Global Action. United Nations Environment Programme
(booklet).
12
UNEP. 2015, 5-6. Gender Equality and the Environment.
United Nations Environment Programme (report).
13
UN Women. 2014, 16. World Survey on the Role of
Women in Development: Gender Equality and Sustainable
Development. New York: United Nations (report).
14
UN. 2015. Sustainable Energy for All: Empowering
Women. UN Chronicle 52 (3), December.
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and critiques is worth presenting in some
detail (emphases added):
“Policy responses that view women as
‘sustainability saviors’ draw upon and
reinforce stereotypes regarding
women’s roles in relation to the family,
the community and the environment.
Such responses often add to women’s
already heavy unpaid work burdens
without conferring rights, resources
and benefits…. [P]erspectives that
view women narrowly as
‘sustainability saviors’ are evident in
many areas, from the conservation of
biodiversity, water and soils to
building socially and environmentally
sustainable services. Yet viewing
women as sustainability saviors carries
dangers.… Policies that are based on
stereotypical assumptions regarding
women’s caring role in the family,
community and environment treat
women as a homogeneous category.
[I]ntensifying women’s workloads to
benefit the community and the
environment can entrench and worsen
gender inequalities…. Responses to
climate change that address gender
issues tend to view women as victims
of climate impacts, or entrench
stereotypes and roles of women as
natural carers keeping their
communities resilient or adopting lowcarbon options.”15
A particular passage is worth quoting more
fully in assessing the discursive impacts of
this approach to policymaking, which we
will analyze more closely in the following
section (emphasis added):
“[T]he view that women should be
harnessed as sustainability saviors [is]
based on the assumption that women
15
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UN Women. 2014, 13, 24, 29. World Survey on the Role
of Women in Development: Gender Equality and
Sustainable Development. New York: United Nations
(report).

are especially close to nature. Womenenvironment connections, especially in
domestic and subsistence activities
such as collecting fuelwood, hauling
water and cultivating food, were often
presented as if they were natural and
universal, rather than as the product of
particular social and cultural norms
and expectations. Ensuing projects and
policies often mobilized and
instrumentalized women’s labor, skills
and knowledge, thereby adding to
their unpaid work without addressing
whether they had the rights, voice and
power to control project benefits. A
number of useful lessons emerge from
this history for policymaking. First,
policymakers should avoid making
broad and stereotypical assumptions
about women’s and men’s
relationships with the environment.
Rather, policies should respond to the
specific social context and gender
power relations. For instance,
women’s close involvement in
gathering wild foods and other forest
products might reflect labor and land
tenure relations and their lack of
access to income with which to
purchase food, rather than reflecting
their closeness to nature.”16
Intersections of (In)justice
Against this backdrop, then, we
observe a perverse tendency to look to those
with ostensibly less power for signs of
innovation and resilience. A clear example
of this is the aforementioned view of women
as “sustainability saviors” or “gender heroes”
and the implications thereof. At root, the
argument is that due to their closer
connection to the material bases of life in
many locales—including procuring food,
fuel, water, and other basic goods—women
16

Ibid. 28-29.
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have a unique capacity to address larger
environmental challenges. While perhaps
this can be empowering on some level, as
noted, it also potentially reifies historical
associations of gender and nature that are
problematic, as well as essentializing the
“caregiver” roles of women as being
inherent, inevitable, and freely chosen.
These constructions often overlook the more
structural realms of political economy,
decision-making power, cultural norms, and
relative autonomy. By casting women as
“saviors” or “heroes” for their ostensible
environmental innovativeness and resilience,
it can further reinforce these roles and
increase the burdens on women to perform
them. Further, these tendencies within
environmentalism raise questions about the
power dynamics between those in the role of
“empowering” the communities at risk and
those “being empowered.” In the context of
where this analysis began, similar patterns
therefore emerge in which the authentic
narratives of those most directly impacted
are being coopted by other actors. Whether
or not the top-down narratives of women as
“saviors” and “heroes” fundamentally
challenge the intersectionality of their
marginalization in the local and global
contexts must be scrutinized to fully
contemplate the potential and the limit of the
“environmental justice frame.”17
The question, then, is how to engage
these pressing environmental issues without
resorting to either victimization or
valorization. One starting point is to
acknowledge the differential impacts of
environmental issues more deeply and resist
the tendency to universalize the capacity
and/or responsibility for remediating them to
those most acutely impacted. Affording
people the space to define their own terms of
engagement with environmental issues is

critical, and whatever sense of
empowerment that may flow from these
choices can be self-selected rather than
imposed. Thus, notions of “harnessing the
power” of women (as referenced in the
aforementioned 2014 UN publication on
Gender Heroes) as paragons of
sustainability raise implications that can
only be harmonized with the tenets of justice
if that power is freely given and
contextualized within the unique
experiences of individuals—rather than
being categorically attributed by others:
“Policies that are based on stereotypical
assumptions regarding women’s caring role
in the family, community and
environment … ignore the vital intersections
with other inequalities that shape women’s
interests, knowledge, values, opportunities
and capabilities. Power imbalances in
gender relations, in the exercise of rights,
access to and control of resources, or
participation in decision-making, determine
whether women’s actions and work translate
into enhanced rights and capabilities, dignity
and bodily integrity.”18
Despite some conceptual and
pragmatic gains around these issues in
recent years, the role played by factors
including race and gender remains relatively
undertheorized in the annals of
environmentalism. The legacy of
environmental racism persists, evident not
only through an analysis of dramatic events
such as Hurricane Katrina but likewise in
the accrued impacts of structural violence on
economic outcomes, educational
opportunities, policing and incarceration,
and other critical issues. Ongoing effects of
the colonization of indigenous communities
can be seen in patterns of toxification,
desertification, and displacement as
registered in rates of impoverishment and

17

18

Čapek, Stella M. 1993. “The ‘Environmental Justice’
Frame: A Conceptual Discussion and Application.” Social
Problems 40 (1): 5-24.

UN Women. 2014, 24. World Survey on the Role of
Women in Development: Gender Equality and Sustainable
Development. New York: United Nations (report).
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negative health consequences. In much of
the developing world women are challenged
by environmental degradation, which can
heighten the burdens of providing essential
resources for their families and also serve to
increase their exposure to violence.
Historically, issues ranging from resource
exploitation to the closure of the commons
still reverberate for many peoples and
communities around the globe.19 The list of
such examples is very long, indicating the
centrality of environmental issues to the
search for justice.
Indeed, the confirmation of one of the
core tenets of environmental justice—
namely that those who contribute the least to
crises are often impacted the most by them,
skewed along preexisting lines of power and
privilege—looms prominently in the context
of contemporary ecological problems.20 The
extant cases of differential impacts appear in
considerations of food deserts, post-disaster
contexts, pipeline constructions, siting of
toxic facilities, substandard living conditions,
refugee encampments, and more.
Unsurprisingly, environmental issues—from
the lack of access to healthy food and clean
water to resource conflicts and climate
change—can intensify deeply rooted
patterns of inequality and injustice that
render vulnerable and/or marginalized
communities even more so as existing
challenges mount.21 The decades since the
advent of environmental justice have borne
this out across myriad geographies, fostering
an emerging cognizance of how these issues
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Ammons, Elizabeth, and Modhumita Roy, eds. 2015.
Sharing the Earth: An International Environmental Justice
Reader. Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press.
20
Pellow, David Naguib, and Robert J. Brulle, eds. 2005.
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are deeply and unavoidably interconnected
across both time and space.22
Still, while the substantive aspects of
such matters may be more widely
understood as intersecting, less attention has
been afforded to the patterns of interlocking
injustice that illuminate the disparate lived
experiences of environmental crises. In other
words, a growing consciousness of issueoriented integration does not necessarily
equate with a more nuanced understanding
of how this actually plays out in the lives of
individuals and their communities: “The
task now is to create movements that reflect
not just the complexity of issues, but of
people’s lives.”23 The emerging paradigm of
intersectionality, especially as it applies in
the context of environmental justice, holds
promise as a tool to further unpack both the
impacts of and possibilities for meaningful
engagement with socioecological
challenges.24 In brief, intersectionality
inquires more deeply into how various
factors of identity formation and attribution
work together to yield differential frames of
experience in a manner that exceeds the sum
of its parts.25 This is so at the macro and
micro scales, whereby people who are
collectively exposed to an environmental
crisis will bear the impacts distinctively visà-vis other communities, and differentially
within their society based on factors such as
22
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access to resources, power, education, and
status.26
The core of this intersectional
perspective is twofold, involving a more
sophisticated integration of substantive
issues, as well as a more nuanced
understanding of differential perspectives
and experiences in navigating those issues.
Likewise, the pursuit of justice as a robust
concept in social and environmental realms
alike necessitates more direct contributions
from those most impacted in order to realign
baseline operations of power and
participation. A potent mechanism for
undertaking these efforts is the cultivation of
pathways for engagement with pressing
issues that highlight the substantive
complexities and grounded voices of people
situated in place. Rendering those stories
and viewpoints more fully is beyond the
scope of this piece, but the following
frameworks may provide points of departure
for further explorations.
Reclaiming the Narrative
As we consider ways to confront
environmental crises consistent with this
expansive vision of justice—and that do not
perpetuate the imbalances of power and
untenable dualisms that have fomented the
crises in the first place—we are cognizant of
the insights gleaned from others who have
raised similar queries. As Phoebe Godfrey
and Denise Torres have observed, “we can
no longer continue to destructively enact
Western ‘white’ patriarchal capitalist
society’s … conceptualization of a clear
boundary between the ideological and the
material, the social and the environmental,
the human and the non-human, the observer
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and the observed, the word and the flesh.”27
Thus, from a policymaking perspective, a
critical question that has not been addressed
adequately is whether “progress” as a
function of development is possible without
destroying the environment(s) upon which
we are dependent and to which we are
connected. In other words, is “sustainable
development” feasible at this juncture, or is
it an atavistic concept that has already been
coopted by essentialism and
commercialization? “To break out of these
cycles,” writes Toban Black, “it is crucial to
support those who live on the frontlines [and]
to tap into their proactive motivations, as
well as their concrete experiences with
higher risk conditions where environmental
impacts may be the most apparent.”28
Time may tell the full story about
whether this will be sufficient to stem the
tide of destabilization, but unfortunately the
window of time is rapidly closing. What
might be said at this juncture is that there are
models of more participatory governance
and development emerging that hold
promise to empower people to address
concrete issues in their particular
communities—ones that are centered on the
narratives of those most directly impacted
by environmental crises, and that are
reflective of trends embracing an
intersectional view of justice, power, and
ecology. As Alex Reid has observed in the
context of disparate impacts from the
environmental impacts of conflict: “The
pervasiveness of women’s responsibility for
environmental management hinges on a
gendered division of labor, in which women
are often disproportionately responsible for
providing ‘subsistence’ products such as
27
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28
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food, water and fuel…. Where women are
identified as the primary managers of local
resources, effective management and reform
will remain incomplete and ineffective if a
gendered lens is not considered…. [B]oth
gender and the environment are crosscutting issues that need more than fine
words and inadequate resources.”29 As we
consider ways to move discursive overtures
toward tangible outcomes, the following
spheres may serve as points of engagement
with this emerging perspective:
Desegregating Nature: We cannot
separate environmental issues from the lived
experiences of people. “To face the
increasingly urgent challenges of global
climate change, fresh-water shortages,
persistent fossil-fuel dependence, cascading
extinctions, and inequities behind the spread
of poverty and food insecurity will require
the best of human imagination and
responsibility because, at end, they are
moral crises…. My intent is not to paint a
simplistic scene of victims and aggressors,
with single proximate factors of cause and
effect, but to recognize that the complexities
and ambiguities of this nation’s
multicultural past and present, and the ways
in which American culture has used or
impacted the Earth, cannot be separated
from underlying values that have fed racism
and systemic inequality.”30 Numerous
community-based environmental entities are
cognizant of these realities, sometimes
framing their work specifically with regard
to the historical and contemporary
landscapes in which these efforts occur. To
take one such example, Soilful City
(www.soilfulcity.com) in Washington, DC,

emphasizes its urban gardening work as part
of an emerging “Afro-ecology” that is
informed by the realities of “African
Diasporic culture” and that strives to
reconnect “people and the land.”
Situated knowledge: Such
interventions require understanding the
context in which the production of
knowledge and resources alike are
connected to structures of power and politics.
“From an intersectional understanding, how
individuals relate to climate change depends
on their positions in context-specific power
structures based on social categorizations
[that] should not be regarded as fixed; they
always need to be understood in their
specific historical and spatial context and as
embedded in power patterns…. [A]n
intersectional framework must go beyond
naming categories to an analysis of how
they are related to broader power relations,
to politics and institutional practices and to
norms and symbolic representations.”31
Thus, we can discern compelling examples
of how this looks in practice: “Whether it is
indigenous women in the Amazon fighting
corporate polluters and climate change or
undocumented Latina domestic workers
advocating for worker rights and dignity in
California, women’s groups and networks
are making links between unbridled
capitalism, violence, and the erosion of
human rights and destruction of the Earth.”32
Planting Seeds: A potent illustration—
which brought its founder a Nobel Peace
Prize—demonstrates how these factors can
be leveraged by people toward selfempowerment: “The Green Belt Movement
(GBM) is an environmental organization
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that empowers communities, particularly
women, to conserve the environment and
improve livelihoods. GBM was founded by
Professor Wangari Maathai in 1977 under
the auspices of the National Council of
Women of Kenya (NCWK) to respond to
the needs of rural Kenyan women who
reported that their streams were drying up,
their food supply was less secure, and they
had to walk further and further to get
firewood for fuel and fencing. GBM
encouraged the women to work together to
grow seedlings and plant trees to bind the
soil, store rainwater, provide food and
firewood, and receive a small monetary
token for their work”
(www.greenbeltmovement.org). “Then came
the revolution. The women decided to do
away with the professional approach to
forestry and instead use their common
sense! … Twenty years down the road, the
women have gained many skills and … have
become self-reliant in tree planting.”33 The
work of the GBM has taken place against
backdrop of colonialism and political
conflict, striving from the outset “to
integrate and advance the causes of
environmental, women’s, and human
rights,”34 through synthesized approaches
that recognized the intersectional nature of
these issues. Indeed, as our analysis here
indicates, the inherently intertwined nature
of these spheres counsels that work must be
done in all of them simultaneously if true
gains are to be made in any of them.

narratives of the marginalized population as
heroes or victims of climate change and
environmental degradation. By intentionally
and consciously activating local voices,
especially those whose heightened risks of
environmental hazards stem from structural
injustices, the “engaging narratives”
approach acknowledges that addressing
environmental issues must simultaneously
tackle the inherent intersectionality and
systemic dimensions of the challenges,
including pervasive gender, economic, and
ethnic disparities that exist at all scales.35
The deployment of these narratives thus
becomes a way of amplifying the existing
forces of resistance and struggle, without
casting the people and places at the center of
these issues as agency-less victims waiting
to be empowered.36 Such forms of
“environmental justice storytelling,” as
Donna Houston observes, can carry “diverse
ideas along together to produce different
environmental imaginaries (both good and
bad) in and of a damaged world,” by valuing
storytelling as much as the stories
themselves.37 Rather than reinforcing the
storytellers’ innovation or resilience against
environmental injustices as the
manifestation of their exotic otherness, the
critically engaged narratives would
illuminate the sense of a shared humanity
across diverse experiences, and therefore
emphasize the collective stake involved in
tackling global environmental challenges.
The engaged narrative approach also
serves as a reminder to broader

Conclusion
The employment of engaged narratives
in environmental movement work avoids the
pitfalls of the simplistic competing
33
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environmental movements about the
inherent privileges of the North in
addressing global environmental issues, and
offers a reflexive moment to acknowledge
the power dynamics that pervade current
dominant environmental movements across
the globe. Similarly, we posit that exploring
engaged narratives addresses the broader
gender-environment intersections in the
existing movement narratives that tend to
situate both as powerless recipients of
violence and exploitation. “The importance
of gender in our understanding of the
environment and conflict is often
camouflaged,” as Reid argues, and “failing
to include gender in [policymaking] is a
flawed approach from both an
environmental and a human rights
perspective.”38 Identifying and deploying
narratives that counter this tendency can
become a form of genuine empowerment in
which notions of femininity and women’s
roles are fundamentally challenged while
addressing the overarching environmental
concerns.
The exemplars cited here are more
than merely discursive in nature: they are
about people situated in place struggling to
sustain a viable foothold in this world, and
likewise to point a way forward for all of us
at the same time. It is a monumental task,
spanning the particular and the universal,
but it is, indeed, essential for the future of
our species on this world. In this sense, “our
demand is not for a return to a pristine past,
real or imagined, or for a perfected utopia
here and now. We seek the dismantling of
unhealthy, oppressive, destructive
technologies in favor of new technologies
that foster autonomy and exist at the
appropriate scale…. We seek a world
premised on the mutuality of ‘human dignity

61

38
Reid, Alex. 2017. Understanding Gender, Conflict, and
the Environment. Toxic Remnants of War Project (June 5).
Accessed 2017. Available from
http://www.trwn.org/understanding-gender-conflict-andthe-environment/

and nature’s wholeness’, recognizing that
we cannot attain one without the other.”39
As scholar-activist Naomi Klein observes:
“Either we fight for a future in which
everyone belongs, starting with those being
most battered by injustice and exclusion
today, or we will keep losing. And there is
no time for that. Moreover, when we make
these connections among issues—climate,
capitalism, colonialism, slavery—there is a
kind of relief. Because it actually is all
connected, all part of the same story.”40
Connecting these issues, struggles, and
stories in a non-superficial, non-exploitative
manner offers a potential pathway toward
addressing today’s critical challenges of
environmental justice.
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